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Introduction - Leonard M. Leiman - Moderator
This symposium, while specifically directed at securities law enforce-
ment priorities, reflects a basic tension between two approaches: on the one
hand, there is the view that strong enforcement is necessary to maintain
public confidence in the securities markets; on the other hand, there is a
concern that imposing harsh penalties on business people, who do not know
the limits of imprecise securities laws, or even understand them, seems un-
fair. The need to accommodate this tension, which probably arose as soon
as the securities laws were enacted in the 1930s, continues today, as is
evident from the dialogues that make up this symposium.
The discussion takes place against a background of several recent
sharply-contrasting enforcement situations. First is the Coated Sales case,
which involved the criminal prosecution in New Jersey of members of man-
agement of a public company who falsified the company's books and stole its
assets, a classic case for aggressive law enforcement. Second, the discussion
also reflects a series of criminal prosecutions brought by the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York which may have been over-
ambitious on the facts or the law and in any event resulted in defendants
being acquitted, having their convictions reversed, or the charges against
them being dropped.
The participants bring together a fascinating breadth of experience.
1 Mr. Leiman is a graduate of Wesleyan University and Harvard Law School.
He is currently employed with the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski and is the
television host of Wall Street Week in Review. He was a representative to a 1974 Joint
American-Japanese Conference on Securities Regulations, sponsored in Japan by
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the University of Pennsylvania, and presented a
paper on comparative securities laws. Mr. Leiman is presently a member of the
Association of the Bar of New York City and has served on committees involving
Professional Responsibility and International Human Rights. He is also a member
of the American Bar Association and the Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities. Mr. Leiman was formerly the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Regulation of Securities and Commodities Options and, is both a frequent lecturer
at Practicing Law Institute programs and author of several published works on
corporate and securities law.
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Michael Chertoff, as the United States Attorney for New Jersey, and Wil-
liam McLucas, as the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, are
two of the most important figures in federal securities law enforcement.
Roberta Karmel, an experienced practicing lawyer and law professor, spent
more than two years as a Commissioner of the SEC; and Edward H.
Fleischman, a distinguished securities lawyer who became an SEC Commis-
sioner in 1986, participated in the symposium on the eve of his retirement.
Alan R. Bromberg is the author of the best-known treatise on Rule lOb-5,
one of the most-used enforcement tools. Theodore V Wells and Lewis Low-
enfels are leading practitioners on the defense side of securities law enforce-
ment actions, civil and criminal.
In the pages that follow, you willfind these participants debating the
basic question of whether decisions to extend governmentaljurisdiction by an
expansive definition of the securities laws are appropriate. The enforcement
officials, Mr. Chertoff and Mr. McLucas, as might be expected, see them-
selves as merely following their mandate to enforce the law, with the choice
of cases determined largely by those who commit the violations. Ms.
Karmel, a persistent critic of the SEC's enforcement policies, is the author of
a book entitled Regulation by Prosecution-The Securities and Ex-
change Commission versus Corporate America .2 It is no surprise to find
her suggesting that fashion, rather than manifest destiny, determines en-
forcement choices. Mr. Fleischman takes afresh look at an old problem: the
propriety of the SEC, as a regulatory agency, acting as both prosecutor and
judge in its enforcement cases. And the defense lawyers, Mr. Lowenfels and
Mr. Wells, would like to see enforcement activity only in the clearest cases,
where punishment is appropriate because a clear line has been consciously
crossed by the defendant.
All the participants are, of course, right at least in part. The law
cannot always be advanced in clearly defined legislative stages. Lawyers
trained in the Anglo-American tradition are accustomed to the common law
development of legal principles through case-by-case decision, and are not
shocked by the retroactivity of this method. Manuel F. Cohen, a career SEC
employee, SEC Commissioner and Chairman of the SEC from 1964 to
1969, believed that the fertile imaginations of those who prey on the invest-
ing public would inevitably find loopholes in rigid rules, and therefore advo-
cated a common law approach to enforcement policy. 3 This is just what the
2 Simon & Schuster (1982).
3 See generally Manuel F. Cohen &JoelJ. Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Stan-
dards: The Importance Of Administrative Adjudication In Their Development, 29 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 691 (1964).
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defense lawyers in this symposium do not want. They would sympathize
with a critic of the common law, Jeremy Bentham, who is supposed to have
complained that judges make law after the fact, 'just as a man makes laws
for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of you
wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. " This view would favor
enforcement only in clear cases of after prospective law changes. The correct
path is almost certainly somewhere between the extremes, and the test of good
law enforcement is how well the enforcement officials define that path.
I used to think that, based on political outlook, there was another gen-
erality that could be applied to this subject. Democrats, who tend not to be
afraid of big government, prefer to govern by regulation, but do not press for
aggressive enforcement because they know that business needs time to adjust
to new laws. Republicans resent over-regulation, but want everyone to play
by the same rules, so they demand fewer laws, but more enforcement. I
suspect that this generalization is not as valid as it once was, if indeed there
ever was any truth in it. Perhaps, as the Administration turns over in
1993, we willfind out.
Part I
SEC Priorities in Enforcement
Leonard M. Leiman
Our first speaker is William McLucas of the Division of En-
forcement of the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC). I
would like to point out that the position of Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement is not a position that has existed at the Com-
mission through its entire life. For most of the life of the SEC,
there was no Division of Enforcement. Anyone organizing an
agency like the SEC would naturally think that as an enforcement
agency there should be a division charged with an enforcement
role. Nevertheless, for many years there was a firm belief that
enforcement responsibility should not be separated from the di-
visions of the Commission that deal with substantive regulation.
The belief was that as the regulators developed new principles of
regulation, if enforcement became too separate from such devel-
opment, it might reflect the uncertainties of the rules and the ap-
propriate nature of regulation. It took a Republican
Administration in 1972 to create the Division of Enforcement. At
that time, all of the Commission's enforcement powers were
taken away from the operating divisions and put into the enforce-
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ment division. To the credit of those who have occupied the top
position in that division, they have been terrific people, leading
right up to the present director, William McLucas. Those who
attempted to prevent the separation of enforcement have not
proved to be justified and I think the reason is because the Divi-
sion has been reasonably sensitive to the problems of regulation.
Bill will talk about priorities in enforcement, a subject which em-
phasizes the relationship between the regulatory purposes of the
Commission and the enforcement of the rules that the Commis-
sion has developed.
William R. McLucas4
Since we have formed a separate division and have taken that
power, I can tell you that we are not going to give it back. I have
been the Director of the Division of Enforcement for two years
and four months, and the most notable problem I have seen
since I have been the Director is that I have gotten grey hair,
gained weight and witnessed my salary increase but my hourly
rate decrease.
When we talk about what the Division does and what the
Commission is going to do in terms of priorities, it really is inter-
esting. I came to the Commission in 1977. If we were to take a
snapshot of the inventory of cases that the Commission was in-
volved in fifteen years ago and compare it to what the Commis-
sion is doing today, you will probably find that approximately
seventy percent of the inventory of cases is quite similar today to
what we had fifteen years ago.5 Policing, accounting, financial
4 Chief of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission.
B.S., Pennsylvania State University (1972). J.D., Temple University School of Law
(1975). Past positions held by Mr. McLucas at the Securities and Exchange
Commission include Assistant Director, Associate Director and Director of
Publications. Mr. McLucas is also the author of several publications on securities
law.
5 See, e.g., SEC v. Century Mortgage Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,777 (Jan. 17, 1979) (fraudulent sales of securities); SEC v. Hart,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,454 (May 26, 1978) (false and
misleading financial statements); SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,352 (Mar. 9, 1978) (misappropriation of as-
sets); SEC v. SCA Services, Inc., No. CIV.A.77-, 1977 WL 21710 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
8, 1977) (anti-fraud, reporting and proxy solicitation violations); SEC v. Forest
Labs. Inc., No. CIV.A.77-2745-MEL, 1977 WL 21271 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1977) (in-
flating revenues).
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disclosure and deterrance of fraud are probably the core mission
of the Agency, the basic reason for our existence. That was true
in 19346 and is true today. That core part of the enforcement
program remains, probably, the single largest area where we
devote manpower and resources. Currently, the inventory of
those cases is up slightly. We probably instituted about fifteen to
sixteen percent more cases in the accounting and financial disclo-
sure area this year than we had last year. That is a function, to a
great extent, of the current economic climate7 we are in and the
expectation that comes with a recession or during difficult eco-
nomic times. Within a year or eighteen months we have been
seeing an increase in accounting-disclosure problems "kick out"
at the Commission in the filings and the disclosures that public
companies make.8 But the core program has essentially re-
6 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to regulate post-distribu-
tion trading of securities in the secondary market by protecting ordinary investors
and the general public by promoting disclosure of information, regulating securi-
ties markets and the amount of credit used in them, and imposing sanctions for
abuse of the facilities for trading securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988). The fun-
damental purpose of the 1934 Act was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
7 See generally David R. Altany, Slow Slog Upward, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 21, 1992,
at 51 (economic recovery figures); James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, Will the
Fed Put America Back to Work?, Bus. WK., Sept. 21, 1992, at 23 (Federal Reserve and
its economic recovery initiatives); Fearing the Worst, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1992, at 73
(economic downturns in worldwide financial markets); Stephen Greenhouse, It
Didn't Only Seem Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, § 4 at E2 (revised recession statis-
tics); John Greenwald, The Great American Layoffs, TIME, July 20, 1992, at 64 (indus-
try unemployment figures); S.C. Gwynne, The Long Haul, TIME, Sept. 28, 1992, at
34 (economic burde.is facing America); Marc Levinson, A Wimp of a Recovery, NEWS-
WEEK, July 13, 1992, at 48 (sub-par recovery from the 1990-91 recession); Janet
Novack, Recession? What Recession?, FORBES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 38 (state and local
budget difficulties).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, commonly
referred to as the '34 Act, created a continuous mandatory public disclosure system
regulating the secondary securities market. It applies to corporations and those
who stand in a fiduciary capacity to the corporation: officers, directors, employees
and shareholders are considered insiders. The current § 13(d) requires a person
who acquires more than five percent of the shares of a publicly traded company to
file a Schedule 13D disclosure statement with the exchanges, the SEC and the tar-
get corporation within ten days of the acquisition. Id.
Section 13 of the '34 Act requires corporations to register with the SEC and
file periodic reports if: (1) the corporation lists its securities on a national securities
exchange pursuant to § 12(b); (2) any class of its equity securities is held by at least
500 persons and the corporation has gross assets over a specified level (currently
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mained the same whether one looks at market manipulation, po-
licing activities of broker-dealers and their relationship to
customers, the regulatory responsibilities in the industry, or po-
licing activities of investment advisors. Some change in the over-
all allocation of resources to different program areas obviously
takes place! It is a function as much of the marketplace as it is of
the priorities of the Commission and the Chairman at any partic-
ular time.
The world today is a lot different than it was ten or fifteen
years ago. We were in a market in 1980 where total trading on
the exchanges was about $476 billion. 9 By 1990, total trading
had increased to $1.8 trillion.' 0 The international flavor of the
market today is dramatically different than what it was ten years
ago."I Reflected in enforcement cases of eight or ten years ago,
the extent of our international issues in enforcement cases pri-
marily involved the use of Panamanian corporations, 12 Bahamian
$5 million dollars in accordance with § 12 (g)); or (3) the corporation files a Securi-
ties Act of 1933 registration statement that becomes effective pursuant to § 15(d).
The required § 13(a) periodic reports are (1) the annual report on Form 10-K,
containing audited financial statements and a detailed description of the corpora-
tion, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-l (1992); (2) quarterly reports on Form 10-Q using
unaudited financial statements, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1992); and (3) current
material developments reported on Form 8-K within ten days of the month in
which the event occurred, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 1 (1992). The '34 Act further
requires, under § 16, that insiders and their tippees disclose all material informa-
tion prior to trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
Section 14 of the '34 Act regulates proxy disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988).
Schedule 14A outlines the material information which must be disclosed to share-
holders concurrently with proxy solicitations. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAws 643 (1991). The Williams Act of 1968, as
amended, added to the disclosure requirements of the '34 Act in takeover and cor-
porate control transactions. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(1968). The Williams Act also added § 14(d) which currently requires the filing of
Schedule 14D-1 disclosing the particulars of any tender offers that result in the
bidder owning five percent or more of a class of publicly traded stock.
9 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1991 (111 th
ed.), at 514, tbl. no. 841.
10 Id.
1l 1990 SEC ANN. REP. 4, 21. See generally Charles E. Engros, Jr. & Patricia K.
Schlegel, Integrating the U.S. Into Global Securities Markets, 24 REV. OF SEC. & COMM.
REG. 169 (1991); Linda C. Quinn et al., Internationalization of the Securities Markets, in
SECURITIES REGULATION, at 7 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 712, 1990).
12 E.g., SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986) (gold mining tax shelters
in Panama and French Guiana); SEC v. Foundation Hai, 736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (insider trading action against Panamanian and Lebanese corporations); SEC
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banks,' 3 Liechtenstein-based anstalts,' 4 Swiss bank accounts
15
and trading in our markets during mergers and acquisitions de-
velopments in the 1980s. 6 Those issues continue to surface, but
there are many other international issues that could come up just
in the enforcement program. We have to deal with questions of
getting the accounting work papers' 7 when United States con-
glomerates, who have major operations abroad, are audited by an
affiliated United States auditing firm. These issues raise many
problems in dealing with foreign jurisdictions, foreign regula-
tors, domestic issuers and their auditors. We recently brought
v. Hansen, 726 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (illegal "day-trading" through a Pana-
manian corporation); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (insider trad-
ing case involving Panamanian entities), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988); SEC v. Ablan, [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,209 (July 23, 1985) (injunctive and monetary relief against a Pana-
manian business); SEC v. Allison, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,545 (Nov. 1, 1983) (violators included five Panamanian corporations and a
Panamanian religious society); SEC v. Drucker, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,529 (Sept. 26, 1983) (defendant attempted to hide his personal
violative activities behind the mask of a Panamanian entity); SEC v. Everest Man-
agement Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,814 (July 30,
1982) (civil injunctive action against forty-four defendants regarding securities vio-
lations involving Panamanian and Liechtenstein-based entities and Swiss bank
accounts).
13 SEC v. Levine, [1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,761
(June 5, 1986) (secret purchases and sales of securities through a Bahamian bank).
14 E.g., SEC v. Finacor Anstalt, No. CIV.A.89-7667-JMC, 1989 WL 258401
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1989) (Liechtenstein-based entity allegedly violated antifraud
provisions in making $2.8 million in illegal profits); SEC v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,586 (May 4, 1979)
(action against defendant for improper and questionable payments to various for-
eign entities, including a company from Liechtenstein).
15 See, e.g., Tome, 833 F.2d at 1095; SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(granted subpoena duces tecum requested by SEC, in part, for defendant's records
with Swiss bank); SEC v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (preliminary
injunction prohibiting defendant from transferring funds to Swiss bank); SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (action against a Swiss
corporation); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, & Call
Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1983 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,424 (July 25, 1983) (enforcement action against de-
fendants subject to Swiss banking secrecy laws).
16 E.g., SEC v. Wang, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,727
(May 22, 1989), 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1991); SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990); SEC v. Heider, No.
CIV.A.90-4636-CSH, 1991 WL 296464 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1991); SEC v. Founda-
tion Hai, 736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
17 Obtaining accounting workpapers is a common investigative step in any Com-
mission inquiry into the adequacy of an issuer's financial disclosure.
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our first case involving what is called "Reg S, ' '18 a new regulation
that permits the issuance of stock to foreign investors, which then
is subsequently brought or sold back into the United States mar-
kets without the benefit of registration. That kind of develop-
ment was probably unheard of or unthought of about ten years
ago, and these kinds of international issues are going to continue
to be a major component of our markets as we move into the
1990s.
Ten years ago we had nothing close to what exists today in
the high-yield bond market. 9 Today, we have a high-yield bond
market in excess of $200 billion where there is no transparency.2 0
18 SEC v. Westdon Holding & Inv., Inc., No. CIV.A.91-7531-KTD, 1992 WL
136673 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992). "Regulation S is not available for any transaction
or chain of transactions that is part of a plan or scheme to evade ... registration
requirements." Id. at *2. Regulation S, which was promulgated pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1992), appears in 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-904 (1992). For a discussion
of the significant provisions of Regulation S, see R. Brandon Asbill, Securities Regula-
tion-Great Expectations and the Reality of Rule 144A and Regulation S; The SEC's Ap-
proach to the Internationalization of the Financial Marketplace, 21 GA J. INT'L & COMp. L.
145 (1991).
19 See generally EDWARD I. ALTMAN, DISTRESSED SECURITIES, ANALYZING AND EVAL-
UATING MARKET POTENTIAL AND INVESTMENT RISK (1991); EDWARD I. ALTMAN &
ScoT-r A. NAMMACHER, INVESTING IN JUNK BONDS, INSIDE THE HIGH YIELD DEBT
MARKET (1987); Ralph H. Fletcher, Jr. & Stephen D. Gray, Private Placements' Big-
Screen Success, CORP. CASHFLOW MAG., Mar. 1990, at 32 (volume of private place-
ments now matches or surpasses the number of transactions in securities markets);
R.S. Salomon, Jr., Leverage in Reverse, FORBES, June 8, 1992, at 161. "Today compa-
nies have every incentive to reduce, rather than build, debt levels." Id. See Simon
M. Lorne, Securities and Securities Law Issues in Troubled Debt Situations, in HIGH-YIELD
BONDS 1991: RECENT TRENDS IN WORKOUTS, EXCHANGE OFFERS AND BANKRUPTCY,
at 111 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 376, 1991).
In the current environment, with the relatively recent advent, growth
into substantial significance, and then collapse-with some fair question
as to the next stage of the cycle-of the high-yield debt (or "junk bond")
market, there has been a sea change in the nature of holders of debt. A
very large number of debt transactions that would have involved bank or
insurance company loans (or syndications) only a few years ago now in-
volve a more disparate group of security holders. For the most part,
while these new lenders are a less cohesive group than those they re-
placed, the securities they acquired, typically in an offering registered
under the securities laws, or in a private placement with rights to such
registration, had greater liquidity.
Id. at 114-15.
20 The total dollar volume of outstanding registered high yield securities, as of
September 30, 1989, was approximately $204 billion. THE HIGH YIELD REVIEW
(Oct. 1989), Drexel Burnham Lambert. See also Div. OF MKT. REG., SEC, THE COR-
PORATE BOND MARKETS: STRUCTURE, PRICING AND TRADING 3 (1992) ("As of Febru-
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This means there is no real time reporting of price, volume and
interval of trading. When you look at that market, my sense is
there are some problems there. There are some abuses, and I
believe you may see some cases involving trading in that market
over the next year or so. There is a movement involving prod-
ding of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) by
the Commission to develop a market system for real time report-
ing of trades, pricing and volume in the junk bond market.2'
A year ago I would not have predicted that the SEC would
be involved in probably the most substantial investigation of the
United States Treasury market that we have ever undertaken, but
now we have probably six to fifteen professionals any day of the
week devoted to our investigation of possible abuses in the sale
of treasury securities.22 I hope these investigations will yield
some developments from the enforcement standpoint in the not
too distant future. Within the last two months, the Commission,
with the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, pursued ninety-nine administration proceedings against
banks, broker dealers and government securities dealers in con-
nection with false reporting of customer orders to the govern-
ment sponsored' enterprises-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Sally
Mae and a few others. 2' This was unanticipated a year ago, and
certainly was not perceived to be an issue ten years ago.
ary 1991, the total face value of the high yield market was estimated at $226
billion.").
21 See Letter from Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC, to Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Sen-
ate (Mar. 29, 1991), in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1991, at 25 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 755, 1991). "[W]e are concerned about the lack
of transparency of information in the high-yield debt and other securities markets
and we are working to encourage the development of an appropriate trade and
quotation system for this market." Id. at 28.
22 See SEC v. Salomon, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3691-RPP, 1992 WL 114584
(S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1992) (recent significant fraud case arising out of misconduct in
the government securities market); Steve Rosenbush, SEC Reveals Settlement With Ex-
Salomon Officers, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 4, 1992, at 47-48 (sanctions imposed
for failure to supervise bidding). Other investigations potentially involving abuses
in the sale of treasury securities are currently ongoing and are therefore non-pub-
lic. See also Martin Dickson, Dog Days Unleash Merger & Scandal, FIN. POST, Aug. 17,
1991, at 17 (discusses U.S. treasury paper scandal involving rigged bidding).
23 E.g., In re Distribution of Sec. Issued by Certain Gov't Sponsored Enters., Ad-
min. Proc. No. 3-7646, 1992 WL 13151 (Jan. 16, 1992) (distribution of unsecured
debt securities of government sponsored enterprises).
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Today, we are seeing both a marketplace and an enforce-
ment program that are considerably different from that of a dec-
ade ago. We have an agency which, when everybody shows up,
has about 2,500 people. This relatively small agency oversees
the capital markets of the United States. We oversee and regu-
late about 12,000 public companies, 17,000 investment advisors,
some 400,000 plus people in the securities industry and a sub-
stantial amount of trading on a daily basis. 24 The regulatory sys-
tem is designed hopefully not only to make sure the market
works and is liquid, but also to function with some sense of integ-
rity. It is quite remarkable, when you consider that the govern-
ment accomplishes this not simply with an agency of 2,500
people, but in reliance on lawyers, accountants, self-regulatory
organizations, the New York Stock Exchange, 5 the American
Stock Exchange 2 6 and the NASD. 27 This self-policing, self-regu-
latory system is designed to make the markets work, to make sure
that people play by the rules, to ensure that the markets remain
liquid and hopefully to provide that the system is not going to
collapse of its own weight. That, I believe, in my role as an en-
forcement lawyer and prosecutor, is the most remarkable aspect
of the way the capital-market system in this country works.
This self-regulatory philosophy also carries with it the as-
sumption that the enforcement agency is going to be tough, rea-
24 See Directory of Companies Required to File Annual Reports With the SEC
for the Year Ended Sept. 30, 1991; 56th Annual Report of the SEC 1990 at 47; U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Budget Estimate, Fiscal 1992, 111-2 (on file
with the SEC).
25 Under § 19 (g) of the Exchange Act, a self-regulatory organization (SRO)
must enforce its rules with respect to its members. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (1988). Sec-
tion 19(d) authorizes the Commission to review final disciplinary sanctions for vio-
lations of the SRO's rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1988). For a discussion of the
enforcement role played by the New York Stock Exchange, see David P. Doherty et
al., The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 637 (1991)
(NYSE-Division of Enforcement is responsible for investigating and prosecuting vi-
olations within the member firm community); 2 NYSE Guide-Constitution &
Rules (CCH) (1984 & Supp. 1992).
26 The American Stock Exchange's Rules are set forth in 2 ASE Guide-Consti-
tution & Rules (CCH) (1984 & Supp. 1992).
27 NASD has a mandate for continual enforcement of the securities laws and its
rules of fair practice. See John E. Pinto, Jr., The NASD's Enforcement Agenda, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 739 (1991). "In 1989, the NASD brought 1,011 formal complaints, ren-
dered 678 disciplinary decisions, and accepted 353 settlement offers. These ac-
tions led to the expulsion of 25 firms, the barring of 286 individuals, and the
suspension of 43 firms and 279 individuals." Id. at 747.
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sonable and fair, but somewhat aggressive. There is an
assumption, I believe, within the free market system, that if you
take down the speed limits and eliminate needless regulatory bar-
riers, you also must have a fairly aggressive shotgun behind the
door so that when there is abuse in the market, you make sure
that the message to the market as a whole is that "if you don't
play by the rules and if you get caught-and there ought to be
some fair probability of getting caught-you're going to really
get whacked."
I have mentioned that our inventory accounting, 28 financial
disclosure 29 and financial fraud cases30 have increased slightly. It
is a cyclical development, and it is not unusual. We always have
the core group of those cases in the program, and I would expect
that will continue to be the case and that we will continue to see
some increase in that area of the program during the next year or
so until the economy rebounds. The market is already re-
bounding. We are seeing an increase in the volume of offer-
ings.3 ' We may see, over a period of time, since enforcement is
28 E.g., SEC v. QT. Wiles, No. CIV.A. 91-1393, 1991 WL 286429 (D. Colo. Aug.
14, 1991) (concealment of a $4 to $4 1/2 million inventory shortfall); SEC v. Antar,
No. CIV.A. 89-3773-NHP, 1989 WL 258995 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 1989) (understatement
of accounts payable and overstatement of inventory); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig.,
714 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (inflation of inventory and per store sales
figures).
29 See, e.g., In re Caterpillar, Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-7692, 1992 WL 71907
(Mar. 31, 1992) (failure to properly disclose a subsidiary's earnings); In re Fleet/
Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-7545, 1991 WL 286391 (Aug. 14,
1991) (materially inaccurate financial statements due to improper accounting).
30 E.g., SEC v. Barette, No. CIV.A.92-1417-TH, 1992 WL 150842 (D.C. Cir.
June 17, 1992) (misstatement of earnings in plot to conceal failure to meet budget-
ary targets); In re Amre, Inc., Admin. Proc. No. 3-7672, 1992 WL 45884 (Mar. 2,
1992) (failure to provide adequate and accurate disclosure regarding accounting
policies and practices); SEC v. Weinstein, No. CIV.A.90-4276-AJL, 1990 WL
321965 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 1990) (creation of phony invoices and receivables over-
stated Coated Sales, Inc.'s earnings). See also Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benja-
min, 786 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (misleading limited partners into investing
in fraudulent schemes); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (possess-
ing confidential information coupled with use of such information for personal gain
is sufficient to establish act of misappropriation); United States v. Sprecher, 783 F.
Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (making false statements to SEC in connection with two
separate security transactions); SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (president was alter ego of corporation and used his dominion
and control to commit fraud).
31 See "Financing America's Growth," Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC, Re-
marks at the National Press Club, Wash., D.C. (Feb. 18, 1992); IPO Quality Slides,
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fundamentally reactive, an increase in the volume of cases that
come out of those offerings. The increase will be either account-
ing disclosure cases or cases involving market abuses by people
who might manipulate those offerings.
The SEC also has a new remedies bill. For fifty years the
SEC ran an enforcement program which was fundamentally re-
medial in nature.32 If you violated the law, the SEC's recourse
was to file an action in federal court and say to the court, "So and
so violated the law, here's the evidence, and we would ask the
court to enter an order that says to him in essence, 'Go and sin
no more.' "33 That was the statutory relief that the SEC was em-
powered to obtain. The SEC coupled with that relief the concept
of ancillary3 4 or equitable relief.35 You could ask ajudge to order
the defendant to give back the money that had been stolen or to
But Market Keeps Surging, CORP. FIN. WK., Mar. 2, 1992, at 1; Anne Newman, IPOs
Continue to Explode But Fireworks Are Fading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1992, at Cl;
Michael Siconolfi, Sizzling New-Issues Market Likely to Continue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1,
1992, at CI.
32 See, e.g., Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7
(1952). The Study states:
Prior to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 it had become clear
that lax financial and ethical standards were undermining the integrity
of the capital markets, destroying investor confidence, and were leading
the business and financial enterprises to the brink of disaster .... [O]ne
of the basic features of the Securities Act was the creation of an adminis-
trative agency with special responsibility for ferreting out securities
frauds ....
Id. See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAw HANDBOOK § 24.02
(1990). Often, the SEC initiates an administrative proceeding to impose sanctions
of a remedial nature for securities violations. Id.
33 Cases in which the Commission has obtained injunctive relief include SEC v.
Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d
1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
34 Courts have held that the power to grant ancillary relief in Commission ac-
tions can encompass a variety of remedies including disgorgement, receiverships
and asset freezing. See, e.g., SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, 830 F.2d 431, 438-39
(2d Cir. 1987) (receivership and fund impoundment), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938
(1988); Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d at 1103 (ancillary relief is usually granted
in the form of a disgorgement of "all the proceeds, profits and income received in
connection" with the violation); SEC v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 314-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (asset freeze).
35 Type of relief sought in a court possessing equitable powers as, for example,
in the situation of one seeking specific performance or an injunction instead of
money damages. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 539 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter
BLACK'S].
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take certain steps that amounted to, in essence, a use of the
court's equitable powers to right the wrong.3 6 It was not neces-
sarily analogous to restitution,3 7 putting people back in the same
place that they were before, but basically to attach some baggage
to the court's order to make sure that the person did not violate
the law in the future. That has all changed. The 1980s saw a
perception in Congress, and probably out in the heartland, that
there was a tremendous amount of excess in and abuse of the
markets. The net result of that in terms of the securities laws
was, in part, the passage of the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,38 which changed the land-
scape to provide that there could be money penalties assessed for
every violation of the federal securities laws. 39 For instance, if a
36 See, e.g., American Bd. of Trade, 830 F.2d at 438 (freezing defendant's personal
assets); Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d at 1103 (ordering disgorgement of all
proceeds, profits and income); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301,
1307-08 (2d Cir.) (restitution of ill-gained profits did not constitute a penalty as-
sessment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. United States Metals Depository, 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (or-
dering disgorgement of all profits because of pervasive illegality and unrepentant
fraud on public); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (freezing assets to assure compensation to victims of security fraud).
37 Equitable remedy by which a person is reinstated to his or her position prior
to the injury or loss. Bt.ACK'S, supra note 35, at 1313. When a person is unjustly
enriched at expense of another, he or she must make restitution to the other. Id.
"Restitution . . . deprives a defendant of the gains from his wrongful conduct."
SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (citing Schine
Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948)). The use of these va-
ried remedies reflects the basic concept that "effective enforcement of the federal
securities laws requires that the SEC be able to make violations unprofitable."
Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d at 1104.
38 Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Remedies Act]. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3(a)(51)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(51)(A) (West Supp. 1991) defines "Penny Stock"
to include "any equity security other than a security" that is:
(a) listed on an exchange or traded through NASDAQ
(b) issued by an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940;
(c) that is a put or call option issued by the Options Clearing
Corporation;
(d) that has a price of five dollars or more.
In addition, "a security that is registered on the American Stock Exchange, Inc.
pursuant to the listing criteria of the Emerging Company Marketplace, that does
not otherwise satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) is specifically
included in the definition of a 'penny stock' under the rule." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-
1(a) (1992).
39 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21B, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1990)
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quarterly report is due on April 15th, and you file on the 16th,
you have violated the law, and therefore can be exposed to a
money penalty.
Next is insider trading.40 In 1984, Congress had already
passed a statute that authorized the Commission to seek money
penalties up to three times the profit gained or the loss avoided
for insider trading.4' The Remedies Act of 1990 applies to all
violations in the public securities division. You can now be ex-
posed to the imposition of civil money penalties for any violation
of law.42 We are using the statute since it applies to conduct that
post-dates October 15, 1990. 4 1 It will take some time before en-
forcement experience develops sufficiently to assess some level
of predictability about what the cost of a particular violation will
be. As we proceed into the 1990s, this will significantly change
the face of public securities law enforcement.
During the 1980s, we saw what the defense bar and a
number of the commentators liked to call the "criminalization of
the process."'44 Here are all these little technical rules that if you
(three tier structure assesses penalty amount based on facts and circumstances);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1990) (substan-
tial penalties levied for any violation of "any provision of this title, the rules or
regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist order entered by the Commission").
40 "Insider trading" is a label applied to a species of securities fraud in which a
person trades based upon possessing material non-public information about the
security obtained in breach of a relationship of trust and confidence. See generally
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Liability for insider trading may also result when a person misappropriates infor-
mation in breach of a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence.
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985)).
When one trades corporate securities for his own account with "access, directly or
indirectly," to facts intended only for a corporate purpose rather than a personal
benefit, he or she may not use such information if it is known that it is not available
to the investing public. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted). In
the case of persons who obtain information as company insiders, a "disclose or
abstain" duty typically applies. In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961).
See also Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems
of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1456-61 (1991) (examines the judicial response to
insider trading cases).
41 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264,
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988)).
42 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43 Remedies Act, supra note 38, § l(c)(1).
44 See Theodore A. Levine et al., Outline of Current Developments Governing Enforce-
ment of the Federal Securities Laws: 1988 Through 1990 Overview, in ALI-ABA POSTGRAD-
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violated them the worst that could happen is that you got an ad-
ministrative proceeding order where the SEC said, "Go, and
don't violate the law in the future." Suddenly, people were being
indicted, tried and, in many cases, going to jail. That is a phe-
nomenon, in part, that arose out of the kinds of cases and situa-
tions that were being pursued. Most of the cases involved abuses
in the American acquisition markets.45 Most of the cases in-
volved conduct which gave the general perception to have gone
quite a degree over the line. These were not people being crimi-
nally prosecuted for jaywalking. My personal opinion is that
these people engaged in serious criminal involvement. Some of
my colleagues share a different view. I can tell you from firsthand
experience that there are vast arguments about it. As we go for-
ward, that is a part of securities law enforcement which I think
will remain a key part of the program that will possibly not have
the kind of prominence and high profile that existed in the
1980s. That is a function to a degree, I would hope, of the suc-
cess of the program over the past few years.
This is true, not only in the mergers and acquisitions cases4 6
and the more sensational insider-trader cases out of the Southern
District of New York,4 7 but the criminal cases that were brought
in the District of New Jersey by the United States Attorney's Of-
fice involving penny stock fraud, dealed with people who basi-
UATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 1569, 1574-75 (1990) (threat of RICO
penalties, with asset seizure and forfeiture, is a substantial element in this criminal-
ization trend); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organiza-
tions, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 315, 330-31 (1991) (applies an agency cost perspective to the
subject of corporate crime); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992) (argues for a tripartite
concept of sanctioning laws that distinguish between criminal, punitive civil and
remedial sanctions).
45 See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,474 (June 20, 1989) (entry of permanent injunction from
violating the proxy, antifraud and reporting provisions of the Exchange Act and the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act); SEC v. Seigal, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,123 (Feb. 13, 1987) (disclosure of material nonpublic
information concerning possible tender offer, acquisition or change in corporate
control); SEC v. Boesky, No. CIV.A.86-8767-RO, 1986 WL 72240 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 1986) (purchase of securities for affiliated entities while in possession of mate-
rial nonpublic information).
46 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
47 See SEC v. Solomon, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,648 (Nov. 27, 1990); SEC v. Milken, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,200 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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cally feigned the results of operations48 for publicly-held
companies, sold their securities, moved to Florida or, in the
worse case, perhaps went to Europe to avoid prosecution. In
part, it was a function of the penny stock abuses out in Denver
and Utah and, indeed, in New Jersey. 49 A lot of that conduct, I
hope, has been dealt with and put to bed, but as we go forward,
you are likely to see continued criminal prosecution of securities
law violations. I would suspect that, for a period of time, we may
not see the same kind of sensationalized cases-there is not likely
to be another Ivan Boesky or Michael Milken case in the immedi-
ate future. That is, in part, a function of what has happened in
the markets; it is a part of the whole function of what was accom-
plished by enforcement efforts, but, as we move into the 1990s,
criminal prosecution of securities law is going to continue to be
an important part of the program.
I will offer a final comment on the process from the Commis-
sion's perspective, and then I am sure we will have some reaction
from the other people here. In our day-to-day investigative work
and in looking at possible violations of the securities laws, there
is an unacceptable amount of perjury, probably in the insider
trading area more than any other area. For some reason, in in-
sider trading cases there is a tendency for people to lie and to
deny whatever the facts are that took place. Part of that, I think,
is the nature of the violation. People do not equate insider trad-
ing perhaps with impropriety to the degree that one might often
think they should. Another element of it is the sense that people
can get away withit and people do not recognize that today there
are telephone records, credit card receipts and a whole host of
vehicles for linking people, conversations and events in time. We
have become pretty good in the investigative process, and we are
able to put that together. The good lawyers counsel their clients
who get into situations where they have to account for their activ-
ities. Rather than have a client come in and lie, a good lawyer
48 E.g., United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1991) (rack-
eteering, scalping, bribery and securities fraud); United States v. Zolp, 659 F. Supp.
692 (D.N.J. 1987) (sufficiently plead allegations included fraudulent activities of
corporation with no legitimate assets and fictitious executives).
49 United States v. Girdner, No. CRIM.A.89-CR-0150-W, 1990 WL 309893 (D.
Utah Feb. 1, 1990); SEC v. Timothy, No. CIV.A.89-C-53 5-J, 1989 WL 257477 (D.
Utah June 29, 1989).
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will tell the client to take the Fifth Amendment.5" While I am
always interested in getting the facts, I would advise everybody,
"Don't worry about the Fifth Amendment, just tell me what hap-
pened." The government will help you. Whatever you do, when
you or a client get into this situation, the worse thing you can do
is not tell the truth, at least to your lawyer. Anybody on this
panel who has been on either side of the fence would probably
tell you the same thing.
Those are essentially my remarks. There is a lot more I
could say. We are litigating a lot more cases now. 5' Securities
fraud and insider trading remains a growth industry. The pro-
gram is as complicated and as interesting as it has ever been, but
there is a finite amount of time. I also saw Ted making notes in
reaction to what I have said, so I will end here. Leonard, you may
have some thoughts.
Leonard M. Leiman
I do indeed. But I would like to ask Roberta Karmel, a for-
mer Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
who has established a substantial reputation for being outspoken
and having opinions of her own, whether she thinks that the pri-
orities Bill McLucas outlined are appropriate priorities for 1992.
Roberta S. Karme 11
I think I continue to be outspoken even though it has been a
50 No defendant in a criminal case shall be compelled by a court of law to be a
witness against himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Lee S. Richards, III &Jonathan
Kibbe, Developing Issues in the Handling of SEC Investigations: The Implications of Defend-
ant's Conduct in SEC Investigations for Related Private Civil Actions and Criminal Investiga-
tions, in 1990 SEC ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE, at 452 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Couse Handbook Series No. B692, 1990).
51 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Budget Estimate, Fiscal 1993,
11-4 (on file with the SEC).
52 Former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1977-
80). B.A. cum laude, Radcliffe College (1959). LL.B. cum laude, New York
University School of Law (1962). Ms. Karmel is a professor of law and Co-Director
of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School.
She is also a partner in the law firm of Kelly, Drye & Warren and is currently a
director of IMCERA Group, Inc. Professor Karmel served as a public director of
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. from 1983-89. Ms. Karmel is a Trustee of the
Practicing Law Institute and a member of the following associations: American Bar
Association Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, the International Bar
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while since I have been a commissioner. My main reaction to Mr.
McLucas' remarks is to agree with his insight that the Remedies
Act53 is going to change the way in which the Commission's en-
forcement program operates. I would say, however, that this will
only accelerate the trend toward criminalization of securities law
violations. The new Remedies Act provides for a variety of sanc-
tions and really does change the nature of enforcement from be-
ing remedial to being penal and that is in the direction of
criminalizing securities law violations.
One of the conclusions that I have reached, watching securi-
ties law enforcement over the thirty years I have been involved in
this area of the law, is that securities prosecutions are really very
political. I think they are more political than is generally con-
ceded by either the government or the private bar. When Direc-
tor McLucas says, "Well, we're not likely to see the
sensationalized cases that we had in the 1980s in the criminal law
area," I think I would reply, "No, we're going to see some other
type of prosecution become sensationalized."
Securities law enforcement is reactive, and it tends to be re-
active in a way that is to some extent political. This is under-
standable since, after all, the SEC is a government agency.
Therefore, what the SEC does is necessarily political to some ex-
tent. However, I think that the SEC should do two things that
tend to be lost in this political criminalization of the securities
law enforcement program. One is to maintain a very broad range
of enforcement cases, particularly in the areas that are important
to the functioning of the markets and the securities industry.
However, if I may say so, these are boring cases involving gar-
den-variety fraud, not headline-grabbing cases. It is very impor-
tant to bring cases in a wide variety of areas to keep the markets
fair and equitable and to keep the securities industry honest.
The other thing the SEC should remember is that the devel-
Association, Financial Women's Association of New York, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York Committee on Securities Regulation and the American Law
Institute. She is a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and is on the Boards of
Advisors of the Review of Securities and Commodities Regulation, the Banking
Law Journal, Business Accounting for Lawyers and the Center for National Policy.
Ms. Karmel is an Advisor to the A.L.I. Corporate Governance Project and has
authored numerous publications, including a bimonthly column for the New York
Law Journal.
53 See Remedies Act, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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opment of the substantive law can be impaired by bringing bor-
derline cases. For better or worse, the securities laws, as a
substantive matter, is the same in both civil, criminal and these
quasi-criminal areas that are covered in the Remedies Act. When
a case is brought as a criminal case and is lost, particularly when
the case is lost because the trial court decision or the SEC admin-
istrative law decision is reversed by either a circuit court or the
Supreme Court, this impairs or undermines a certain view of the
substantive law that the Commission had in mind in bringing a
case. That can have an important adverse effect on the SEC's
enforcement program. I think one of the things that Mr. McLu-
cas did not mention, and I can understand why, is that one of the
reasons there may not be the same kind of criminal cases in the
1990s that we had in the 1980s is that a lot of the high-profile
cases were lost by the government or reversed on appeal.54 This
is something that the Commission, as a whole, has to think about
very carefully in making determinations as to whether cases
should be prosecuted in a civil action, in a criminal action or
under the Remedies Act.55 My own judgment would be that ex-
treme caution should be taken before securities law cases are
brought as criminal cases or penal cases.
Leonard M. Leiman
I would like to turn to Professor Alan Bromberg who among
all of us, given the nature of his work, must have read every case
54 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (6-5 rever-
sal of insider trading Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions; 10-1 affirmance of
insider trading Rule 14e-3 convictions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); United
States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversal of manipulation, mail
fraud and conspiracy convictions; dismissal of indictments); United States v. Regan,
937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversal of tax fraud and RICO convictions and re-
mand of indictments; affirmance of securities fraud convictions); United States v.
GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversal of manipulation, mail fraud and
conspiracy convictions; remand of indictments). The government decided not to
retry the GAF case. Milo Geyelin & Arthur S. Hayes, GAF Prosecutors, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 12, 1991, at B2. "In light of the three prior prosecutions in this matter, the
government believes that the interests of justice will be best served by dismissing
the indictment in this case at this time." Id. (statement of Roger Hayes, Deputy
U.S. Attorney). Likewise, the remanded charges in Regan were not pursued. Wade
Lambert & Milo Geyelin, Princeton/Newport Defendants See Case Dropped by Prosecutors,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1992, at B4.
55 See Remedies Act, supra note 38.
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that ever was and will be in this area. Do you agree with Roberta
Karmel that the Commission's case selection has not been partic-
ularly good from the standpoint of developing the law in con-
structive ways?
Professor Alan R. Bromberg56
De facto, that is true. For example, the four major cases
from the Second Circuit are bound to show that for one reason
or another the SEC did not choose the right cases or did not
prepare them accurately.57 But it seems to me that the Remedies
Act covers important new opportunities. When you go at en-
forcement you have really three kinds of variables to consider: (1)
the violations charge, (2) the kind of procedure you are going to
bring and (3) the kind of sanctions for which you are going to
ask. The Remedies Act affords new dimensions and new flexibil-
ity in all of those variables. So it seems to me that although I
disagree somewhat with Roberta Karmel, I do not regard the
Remedies Act's civil fines as quasi-criminal. I see them as much
more civil. So I see this as an opportunity for the SEC to shy
away from criminal work and to do civil or quasi-criminal work
more effectively and more reasonably, and to avoid some of the
gross injustices of criminal cases which may lead to a real setback
in the development of the law.
56 Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law. A.B., Harvard
College (1949); J.D., Yale Law School (1952). Mr. Bromberg worked in private
practice in Dallas, Texas between 1952-56 and then in 1976 became Counsel to
Jenkens & Gilchrist. Professor Bromberg has been with the Southern Methodist
University School of Law since 1955. He serves as a director to the Texas Business
Law Foundation and has written substantial sections of the Texas securities,
corporation and partnership statutes. Mr. Bromberg is the author of more than
100 articles on securities, corporate, partnership, commodities and tax law. He
also serves as chair to the Legal Education Publications Advisory Board of Matthew
Bender & Co. and is a member of the following organizations: American Law
Institute, Advisory Board of the Review of Securities and Commodities Regulation,
Advisory Board of the Securities Regulation Law Journal, Editorial Advisory Board
of the Journal of Corporation Law, American Bar Association Committees on
Federal Regulation of Securities, Partnerships, and Futures Regulation, and the
Texas Bar Committee on Corporation, Securities, and Partnerships. Professor
Bromberg is a former Chairman of the Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the Texas Bar, former Chairman of its Securities Committee,
Partnership Committee and Former Co-Chair of the Southwestern Legal
Foundation Securities Institute.
57 See supra note 54 for a historical account of Second Circuit reversals.
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Leonard M. Leiman
Thank you Alan. Now, Ed, we will turn to you to ask your
question.
Edward H. Fleischman 58
My question, in general, will go to both what Roberta
Karmel and what Alan Bromberg said. Roberta mentioned
whether the Remedies Act has changed the securities law gener-
ally from remedial to penal. Alan glossed over it when he said
that this is still squarely in the civil position. I understand that, as
I hold that opinion myself. If you do accept the point Roberta
makes, does that not hold quite a different perception in the
courts to prosecutorial efforts, as well as private plans? If the
statutes, in fact, have to be changed, as many people have sug-
gested these last few years, from remedial to penal, will that argu-
ment not be advanced particularly in the appellate courts? Will
there not be a real tidal wave effect back into the reception in the
courts of the enforcement prosecution?
Leonard M. Leiman
Ted, you tried those cases, what do you think?
Theodore V. Wells 59
I was lead counsel in the Princeton-Newport case involving
58 Former 66th Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(1986-92). Graduate of Harvard College; LL.B., Columbia Law School (1959). Mr.
Fleischman served as an officer in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1955. After
obtaining a law degree, Mr. Fleischman practiced law for 26 years with Beckman &
Bogue in New York City where he specialized in securities and corporate law. Since
1976, he has been an Adjunct Professor of Law in securities regulation at the New
York University School of Law. In 1980, Mr. Fleischman was admitted to the bar of
the U.S. Supreme Court and is President of the American College of Investment
Counsel. He is also a member of the American Law Institute and the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries. In the American Bar Association Section of
Business Law, Mr. Fleischman chairs the Committee on Developments in Business
Financing and serves as a member of the Committee on Counsel Responsibility,
Committee on Federal Regulation on Securities, Committee on Futures
Regulation, Committee on Developments in Investment Services and has been
active in the Administrative Law Section.
59 Graduate of the College of the Holy Cross (1972), Harvard Law School &
Harvard Business School (1976). Since 1981, Mr. Wells has been a partner with the
law firm of Lowenstein, Sandler, Kohl, Fisher & Boylan. From 1980-81, he was an
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Mr. Regan,6" and I successfully argued it in the Second Circuit
and the convictions were reversed. 6 ' I have spent the last five
years involved in these so-called high-profile securities cases.62 I
can say, without question, that the message that the Second Cir-
cuit sent was construed by the defense bar as being a rebuke of
the positions taken by the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District. But when Professor Bromberg said that the
SEC Commission lost four cases, or suggested the Commission
lost four cases, I think we have to keep in mind that all of those
four cases were really U.S. Attorney Southern District of New
York cases and not really the Commission's cases. The real con-
cern I have as a practitioner is that nobody today knows what the
rules are. What happened during the late 1980's, in my opinion,
was that the Southern District, really Rudy Giuliani and others in
that office, attempted to change the existing rules by the use of
the criminal process.
Adjunct Professor at the Seton Hall University School of Law teaching trade
regulation. Mr. Wells has also taught trial practice courses for the Practicing Law
Institute and the Harvard Law School Trial Workshop. Significant cases litigated
by him include Leon v. Shane, where he was lead trial counsel and won a multi-
million dollar jury verdict, and United States v. Regan, where Mr. Wells was lead
defense counsel in a Wall Street RICO prosecution. Mr. Wells is a defense lawyer
for the Essex County Urban League. He holds corporate directorships at the
College of the Holy Cross and with the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
In 1989, Mr. Wells was selected by the National Law Journal as one of the top 50
lawyers in the United States under 50 years of age. In 1990, he was also selected by
the National Law Journal as one of the top litigators in the United States.
60 United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), 706 F. Supp. 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), 726 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991), modified, 946
F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2273 (1992). Most of the Regan
defendants were associated with Princeton-Newport Partners, a limited partnership
investment firm, with offices in New Jersey and California. Defendant James Regan
was a managing partner at the firm.
61 Id.
62 Mr. Wells was counsel for various directors, officers or controlling persons in
the following securities cases: James Regan (Wall Street RICO prosecution); Leo-
nard Tucker (prosecution of F.D. Roberts Securities for stock manipulations); co-
counsel for Michael Milken in federal securities class actions in New York and Cali-
fornia; counsel for Michael Steinhardt in Salomon Brothers securities litigation in-
volving possible collusion in the U.S. treasury securities market. His law firm
appeared as counsel in Rolo v. General Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991)
(class action based on fraudulent marketing scheme) & Ford Motor Co. v. Summit
Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991) (counterclaim of violation of
RICO Act).
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As a result of that, none of us who title ourselves as criminal
defenses lawyers are sure right now just what the rules are going
to be in the future. I think it loops back and has a really detri-
mental effect in terms of civil enforcement because, ultimately, it
is important on the civil side, that the Commission get the facts
and get as much information as it can so that remedial remedies
can be shaped. The real problem is that nobody wants to testify;
everybody wants to assert the Fifth Amendment because you do
not know if some over-zealous prosecutor in New York or some-
place else is going to take something that has traditionally been
viewed as a civil wrong and try and convert it into a criminal ac-
tion. Therefore, all of us on the defense practitioner's side of the
fence are being extremely conservative. Ultimately, I do not
think that it really bodes well for the civil side of enforcement
because what you really have now is the potential for criminal
prosecutors and local United States Attorney's Offices to shape
the direction of the securities law, and they can get out in front of
the Commission and the enforcement division. The Commission
has no real power to stop these local prosecutors.
I presently have a case in California where you have people
in the local United States Attorney's Office trying to almost
model themselves after Mr. Giuliani, because they think they
have the next Milken case. I had the craziest case recently. I was
representing a regional brokerage firm based in New Jersey that
did some underwritings in South Carolina. The State prosecutor
in South Carolina had read an article in the newspaper concern-
ing some of Giuliani's prosecutions. The State prosecutor
thought he could take some of the theories he had read about in
the newspaper and (this prosecutor is a guy who practiced pri-
marily in cases involving drugs) attempt to bring a securities
case. This is a guy who knew no more about securities than the
man in the moon. Yet he was going to attempt to try these cases.
The difference between criminal and civil securities cases is often
a pure policy decision, and there is a notion now that any local
prosecutor can become a securities prosecutor. There is a higher
standard of proof in the theoretical sense for criminal securities
cases, but in almost all of these cases if you want to, if it is a civil
wrong, you can say it is a criminal wrong. This is a real problem
for the Commission and the Enforcement Division, which are los-
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ing control of securities enforcement and fast becoming the tail,
as opposed to the head, of the dog.
Lewis D. Lowenfels 63
Picking up on what you said, Ted, it is interesting to me as a
defense lawyer and a corporate securities lawyer. I feel some-
times as though I am sitting at the center of a maelstrom because
you not only have the criminalization of the securities laws, and
United States Attorneys like Mr. Chertoff coming after you, but
also the powers of the SEC with Mr. McLucas. You also have a
tremendous rise in the activity and aggressiveness of state en-
forcement.64 In addition, you have a substantial increase in the
intensity of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), with their market surveillance group and their investiga-
tive forces coming at you. 65 So not only, as Ted says, do you
63 Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. Graduate of
Harvard College and Harvard Law School. In the early 1970s, Mr. Lowenfels was
special counsel to the American Stock Exchange in connection with the
introduction of options trading to the American Stock Exchange floor. Since 1974,
he has been a partner with Tolins & Lowenfels and represents investment banking
firms and Wall Street individuals in all areas of business including public offerings,
private placements, investigations, disciplinary proceedings and arbitrations. He is
currently a member of the American Bar Association, New York Bar Association,
New York County Lawyers Association, Committee on Securities and Exchanges,
American Law Institute and the Southwestern Legal Foundation. Mr. Lowenfels is
also the co-author of a seven volume treatise on securities law.
64 Armstrong v. State, 811 P.2d 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (conspiracy to vio-
late securities act); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah 1991) (felony security
fraud violations); State v. Newman, 469 N.W.2d 394 (Wis. 1991) (conviction on
theft and securities fraud).
65 JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION (1991). "The NASD's scope of
responsibility is broad and includes overseeing the operation of the over-the-
counter market and establishing and enforcing rules for its efficient and fair opera-
tion." Id. at 29.
Nearly all NASD disciplinary proceedings begin at the district level,
where District Business Conduct Committees ... hold such hearings as
are necessary or appropriate to resolve a particular matter .... When a
sanction is ordered at the district level in a formal proceeding, the mat-
ter is reviewed by the National Business Conduct Committee, a commit-
tee of the Board of Governors. The NBCC may order a hearing by a
new hearing panel at the national level even if there is no appeal; such a
hearing is automatically scheduled if the subject does appeal.
Id. at 1196. NASD also has a Market Surveillance Department with computer facili-
ties that monitor all transactions reported through NASDAQ. Jonathan R. Macey &
David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 346 (footnote omitted).
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have a blurring of the rules, but you also have a tremendous ag-
gregate of regulators coming from different angles and different
sides with different interests that they are protecting, with differ-
ent degrees of sophistication and with different degrees of sensi-
tivity to the rights of defendants. It puts a tremendous burden
on business. It is great for people like Ted and I, who make our
living this way, but I really wonder whether this multi-tiered reg-
ulatory thrust is good for the country, particularly when you put
it in the perspective of the small business initiatives, which the
SEC is now trying to promote, and which the American Stock
Exchange is promoting with their emerging market surveillance
systems. 66 You have a number of regulators coming at you utiliz-
ing a number of different remedies based on a number of differ-
ent laws, all with different interests to protect. I think it is a big
problem today.
Professor Alan R. Bromberg
Let me add a footnote to what Lewis Lowenfels said that you
may not be aware of. While Congress has successively raised
fines for securities violations,6 7 Texas, where I live, has gone at it
the other way. Texas has successively raised the prison sen-
tence. 68 Texas now has, for fraud, a minimum prison term of five
66 The NASD has computerized on-line and off-line surveillance of trading and
quotations in NASDAQ securities. All quote changes and transaction reports are
recorded and analyzed by NASDAQ computers, so that surveillance analysts can
reconstruct activity in their investigations. Pinto, supra note 27, at 740.
67 Maximum criminal penalties in Securities Exchange Act § 32 for willful viola-
tion of that Act were increased from 5 years and $10,000 ($500,000 for stock ex-
changes) in 1984 to 5 years and $100,000 ($500,000 for stock exchanges) and again
in 1988 to 10 years and $1,000,000 ($2,500,000 for stock exchanges and anyone
other than a natural person). See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, 1265, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (1984); Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680, 15
U.S.C. 78ff (1988).
68 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (West 1992). Maximum penal penalties
under the Texas Securities Act for fraud were increased from 10 years and $5,000
in 1983 to not less than 2 or more than'10 years and a fine of not more than
$10,000 (or if the offense involves more than $10,000: not less than 2 or more than
20 years and a fine of not more than $10,000) and again in 1991 to not less than 2
or more than 10 years and $10,000 (or if the offense involves more than $10,000
but less than $100,000: not less than 2 or more than 20 years and a fine of not more
than $10,000). If the offense involves more than $100,000: not less than 5 or more
than 99 years of imprisonment and not more than a $10,000 fine. See 1983 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2711 (Vernon); 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2005-06 (Vernon). The
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years and a maximum of ninety-nine years if the violation in-
volves more than one hundred thousand dollars, with an aggre-
gation provision. 69
Leonard M. Leiman
Bill, you are certainly seeing more people resisting the easy
settlements of past days. Lew Lowenfels was also suggesting that
you are also out of synch with the regulatory practice. How
would you respond to that?
William R. McLucas
Well, a couple of things. First of all, my view is absolutely
consistent with reducing or eliminating barriers to capital raising,
capital formation and tougher enforcement. When you lower the
red tape and the rules, however, you also have someone standing
by the road for those people who cannot play by the rules. The
message has got to be: "If you cheat, if you commit fraud, you're
going to get whacked, and you're going to get whacked
severely."
Now, let me go back to a couple of things. You have heard
here that there have been literally four reversals, that there is a
tidal wave against the Commission, against the government, and
against enforcement of the federal securities laws emerging pri-
marily from some of the criminal decisions in the Southern Dis-
trict. 70 There are some problems with some of the decisions that
came down inside the Southern District or from the Court of Ap-
peals in terms of what they mean for the government enforcing
federal securities laws. 7' I would submit to you: 1) there is no
state has traditionally relied more heavily on criminal than on civil enforcement.
Texas securities administrators believe that fines are not an effective discourage-
ment and are rarely collectible, and that only "hard time" in prison is effectively
deterrent.
69 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (West 1992) (amounts obtained under
one scheme or continuing course of conduct are aggregated in determining the
grade of the offense).
70 See supra note 54.
71 For example, the "familial relationship" analysis formulated by the Second
Circuit in Chestman presents a difficult framework for determining when a sufficient
"confidential" relationship exists between family members. United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991). Other courts have handed down
procedural opinions that make it more difficult to obtain meaningful remedies for
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tidal wave; and 2) that is why there are courts and also why the
difficult cases litigate. You do not get the equivalent in the secur-
ities law field of "slip & fall" cases going to the Second Circuit
presenting complex, difficult legal policy judgments. These are
the tough cases, and they are the tough cases because this is
fraud, generally speaking, that is what we are talking about, and
you prove it the hard way-through pieces of paper and circum-
stantial evidence. These are not people who walk through the
door and say, "You caught me." The reversals are obviously
troubling, but there is no tidal wave here. If the government only
brings cases that it wins, or the government only brings cases
that people consent to, then the government is not doing its job.
No prosecutor ought to file a complaint or seek an indictment
where he or she does not believe the evidence is there, that the
conduct ran afoul of the law and it can be proven either to a court
or to a jury. But if a prosecutor in this field, in particular, is only
bringing cases that are so clear and so absolutely certain on the
evidence and the law, that no one can disagree on the merits,
then that prosecutor ought to go out and get another job.
Leonard M. Leiman
Let us hear a practitioner's response to that.
Lewis D. Lowenfels
I want to respond to the first thing you opened up with, Bill,
which kind of made me shudder a little bit. If, and I have seen
this in some of the Commission's briefing statements as well, you
think that by streamlining the quote "red tape" that you, there-
fore, have to be tougher in enforcement to compensate for that, I
respectfully suggest to you that is a very dangerous approach be-
cause when you streamline the red tape, the effect on the Richter
Scale is maybe a one or a one-and-a-half. When you increase en-
forcement, particularly on smaller companies, the increase on the
Richter Scale goes up to around six or seven. I submit to you
securities law violations. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-43 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (vacating injunction entered for registration violation committed by person
not acting with scienter); SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1041-42 (2d Cir.
1990) (limiting circumstances under which Commission can freeze trading accounts
of suspected insider traders).
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that if the trade-off of "streamlining" is going to be more en-
forcement, particularly with respect to smaller companies, I think
we are going down the wrong road.
William R. McLucas
I don't know how to respond to that. You cannot say, "Let's
have the initiative to lessen the regulatory barriers, but let's not
enforce the law."
Lewis D. Lowenfels
I am not saying that. I think it is a question of degree. I
think the enforcement program of the Commission is strong
enough as it is, and I think that when buttressed by the other
regulatory agencies,72 it is even stronger. I certainly do not think
you need to compensate for any "streamlining." I think you just
have to streamline and provide no offsetting compensation.
William R. McLucas
Now you are getting to the point. You are getting to where,
over time, the use of the Remedies Act, 73 the use of penalties will
occur .. .. 74 My view, contrary to Professor Karmel, is that in-
deed the Remedies Act may mean you see less criminal prosecu-
tion in certain kinds of cases because the deterring effect
obtained in the civil context may eliminate the need for criminal
prosecution. I would be interested in Michael Chertoff's reac-
tion to that. But also, I guess, one thing I want to respond to, is
Roberta's remark that all the securities law prosecutions were
political. I assume that she means that with a small "p."
The agency is reactive obviously to the markets, what is go-
ing on in the economy, what is happening in the real world. We
72 In addition to the federal regulatory power of the SEC, state commissions
enforce their own state securities law which are generally referred to as "blue sky"
laws. Cox, supra note 65, at 28. The origin of the name reflects the states' initial
objective of restricting and controlling promoters who would sell interests having
no more substance than "so many feet of blue sky." Id. (quoting Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (upholding the constitutionality of blue sky
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and finding no burden on interstate
commerce)).
73 Remedies Act, supra note 38.
74 See supra note 39.
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cannot have an agency with the responsibilities of the SEC that
exists basically as a magnet. However, on the political issue,
given my personal views, having been there for seventeen years, I
differ, noting that both Roberta and Ed were my clients at various
times during those periods. The issues of who is involved, who
the company is, who the lawyers are, what political party, what
religion, do not come into play in the Commission, probably less
so than any other agency in the government. On that score, the
political issue is with a small "p." It is what is going on in the
market and the economy as opposed to, "Gee, who is this indi-
vidual or who is this company and is this going to be a matter that
would be a good thing or bad thing to pursue." Those judg-
ments are made and called straight up on the facts and the law.
Roberta S. Karmel
There are two comments I would like to make. One is an
elaboration by what I mean by "political." Yes, I mean political
with a small "p." I do think the SEC has always properly func-
tioned with independence in terms of party obligation and any-
thing along those lines. Perhaps a word I could have used
instead of "political" is "fashionable." That seems to almost triv-
ialize what is going on, and yet there are times when that is ap-
propriate. I can remember a time when what was politically
appropriate or fashionable were criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions of Regulation T.75 Today, many people hardly know what
violations of Regulation T are, but, nevertheless, criminal cases
were brought for those violations in the late 1960s. In the 1980s,
insider trading was the politically exciting kind of case, and this
had a lot to do with perceptions about whether the junk bond
market 76 was good or bad for the economy of the country.
The other comment I really wanted to make was in response
to Bill's statement that if a prosecutor is only bringing cases that
75 Credit by Brokers & Dealers, Reg. § 220 [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 47,501, at 47,141 (May 1990). "[Regulation T's] principal purpose
was to regulate extensions of credit by and to brokers and dealers; it also covers
related transactions within the [Federal Reserve System's] authority under the Act.
It imposes, among other obligations, initial margin requirements and payment
rules on securities transactions." Id.
76 See generally ROBERT A. TAGGART, JR., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONs 5-24 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988) (tracking the growth and volatility of the "junk" bond market).
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are clear-cut and that can be won, there is something wrong. In
terms of criminal prosecutions, I strongly disagree. I think that it
happens and it is understandable that at times prosecutions, civil
or criminal, are lost because of a failure of proof that is not antici-
pated. Certainly, in a situation where we have the kind of crimi-
nal justice system enjoyed in the United States, that is
appropriate. On the other hand, it seems to me there is some-
thing wrong when a criminal prosecution is lost on the law. In
other words, where the law was unclear but a criminal prosecu-
tion brought based on the prosecutor's interpretation succeeds
in a district court, but the court of appeals or the Supreme Court
reverses, I question the government's judgment in bringing the
case. It does not seem to me in novel areas such as this, that
criminal prosecutions are appropriate. I would say in civil ac-
tions, the story is different. Perhaps new law can be made in a
civil case brought by the SEC. But I really do not feel it is appro-
priate in a criminal case.
Theodore V. Wells
I would just like to add to what Roberta Karmel is saying in
terms of bringing criminal actions where the law is unclear. 77 I
see it really as a fair notice issue and, in many areas of the gov-
ernment, procedures have been set up to try and deal with this
fair notice issue. For example, in the anti-trust area, the anti-
trust division has enacted guidelines 78 to the effect that it will
only proceed criminally in areas of the law that constitute a hard-
core per se violation of the anti-trust laws, such that every one in
the business community has been put on notice.79 In the tax
77 E.g., United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), 706 F. Supp.
1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), 726 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991),
modified, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2273 (1992) (involved
the controversial issue of whether stock "parking" is a criminal offense).
78 See generally James M. Grippando, Caught in the Non-Act: Expanding Criminal Anti-
trust Liability for Corporate Officials, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 713 (1989); Thomas E.
Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1990); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OFJUST. MANUAL: ANTI-
TRUST Div., tit. 7, ch. 5 (P-H Supp. 1990-91).
79 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1973 & Supp. 1992).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... [A violator] shall be
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area, the Justice Department, in order to put a check on how local
United States Attorney's Offices use their power to bring tax
cases, requires that the main Justice Department in Washington,
D.C. sign off on all criminal tax prosecutions.80 Now why is that?
That is because there is a recognition that you want some type of
central control in terms of how the tax laws are developed. As it
stands now if a criminal tax case is instituted and the court of
appeals rejects the legal theory of the criminal case, the tax regu-
lators, may in essence, be precluded from receiving a judicial de-
cision that might have been received in a civil suit. Whereas in
securities law, right now, there is no real check on local
prosecutors.
There is some notion of comity, but the bottom line is if you
get a powerful United States Attorney in a local office and that
person wants to bring a securities case, that person has the power
to bring it. And he may make bad law. Many of the cases that
were reversed because they were criminal cases, might have been
accepted by the court of appeals if the Commission had argued
them as civil suits. Not only do I feel personally that the criminal
laws have been misused because of the fair notice problem, but
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
80 26 C.F.R. § 301.7602-1(c)(2) (1992).
A Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to any person
when:
(i) The Secretary recommends.., that the Attorney General either
commence a grand jury investigation of or criminal prosecution
of such person for any alleged offense connected with the ad-
ministration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws, or
(ii) The Attorney General... requests in writing that the Secretary
disclose a return of, or return information relating to, such per-
son. The request must set forth that the need for disclosure is
for the purpose of a grand jury investigation of or potential or
pending criminal prosecution of such person for any alleged of-
fense connected with the administration or enforcement of the
internal revenue laws.
The referral is effective at the time the document recom-
mending criminal prosecution or grand jury investigation is
signed by the Secretary ....
Id. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUST. MANUAL: TAX Div., tit. 6, ch. 4 (P-H
Supp. 1992-93).
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we have also all been hurt because, as I stated before, certain
positions of the Commission might have been adopted, but were
rejected because the issues were presented to the court of ap-
peals in the context of a criminal case, as opposed to a civil case.
Roberta S. Karmel
I agree 100% with what Ted said.
Leonard M. Leiman
An extremely well made point. Bill, perhaps you could close
this part of the program by responding to that and along the way
perhaps also comment on the manner in which those priority de-
cisions are made within the Commission. We are all lawyers and
we are at least as interested in process as we are in substance.
William R. McLucas
I think some of what Ted Wells said is true. Unfortunately, it
is true if you look now at a couple of decisions that may indeed
have come out the other way had the cases been presented as
civil proceedings. 8' Which cases become criminal and how they
are pursued clearly is determined in part, as a result of contact
between the staff of the Commission and the United States Attor-
ney's Office. For briefs and positions that are submitted on ma-
jor legal issues, particularly at the appellate level, there is contact
and communication. At the trial level, you can assume there is an
effort by the Commission to basically work with the prosecutors
as to how the law is going to be articulated by the government. It
is very difficult for me to sort out in the major cases, GAF, Regan,
Mulheren, and perhaps Chestman. I think Chestman is a decision
that, on the insider trading holding of the court, it would have
come out the same no matter how the case was presented. 82 I
disagree with the way the court came out. Chestman was not, how-
ever, a reversal entirely.8" But it is hard, sitting here today, to say
81 See supra note 54.
82 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991) (absent fraud by
the alleged misappropriator, defendant could not be derivatively liable as a tippee
or an aider and abettor).
83 Id. (Rule 14e-3(a) conviction prohibiting fraudulent trading in connection
with a tender offer was affirmed, reversed Rule lOb-5 and mail fraud convictions).
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whether the court would have viewed the law differently in a civil
context than it did in the situation that was presented. It may
well be the case, I do not know. The issues of fair notice, and
how the decisions are made, clearly depend on who is in the
United States Attorney's Office. The relationship generally has
been a strong one between the Southern District of New York
and the SEC where these cases came out of. However, we do
have a fair and consistent dialogue with that office about how
cases are going to be pursued and what cases are within the limits
of that dialogue.
Leonard M. Leiman
How about at the level before criminal law? How are those
priorities?
William R. McLucas
Well, do you mean, do we discuss with them whether it is a
civil or criminal context that we are thinking about or ....
Leonard M. Leiman
No, I'm really trying to get below that. You cannot possibly
bring every case that pops into your mind or that appears on
your desk, you take some and not others. You plainly are bring-
ing loads and loads of insider trading cases. There is an implicit
decision that insider trading is an important subject of the Com-
mission to drive home. Is that a reasonable decision at the Divi-
sion's level?
William R. McLucas
Roberta Karmel said that a few minutes ago. She said in-
sider trading was fashionable in the 1980s. It was not fashiona-
ble. It was a fact of life. You had mergers and acquisitions, a
market that was heated up to a degree that had never been seen,
twenty-six year-old kids putting $2,000 into money call options
and making $300,000 and $400,000 using Swiss bank accounts.
It was not a decision made by the SEC that, "Gee, wouldn't it be
neat to try to bring some of these cases." It was a decision driven
by the conduct in the markets.
There was fraud going on in the market in the 1980s, and it
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was a reactive decision and a correct decision to go after it. What
about insider trading cases today? The number of referrals from
the self-regulatory organizations (SROs)a4 are down dramatically
because of a decline in merger and acquisition activities. The
kinds of cases though, are selling on bad news and tipping your
friends and associates. We brought a case yesterday, which is in
the Wall Street Journal today, against two former employees in the
Comptroller of the Currency, who were alleged to have been tip-
ping friends about developments between regulated banks and
bank holding companies and, in one instance, about a scheduled
examination of a financial institution. 5 So it is a decision that is
driven by what the markets are showing and what the market sur-
veillance group is kicking out in terms of how that fits into the
overall program. 6
My view is that we probably made a dent in insider trading.
How much I cannot tell you. The decline may be more a function
of the markets in the merger and acquisition activity than it is the
result of people afraid of going to jail. But it will remain a rea-
sonably consistent element of the program going forward be-
cause it is something we ought to be doing. That decision is
made to a great extent at the staff level with the Commission ba-
sically reviewing the cases and the allocation of its resources as
we assess those cases through the decision-making process.
84 Cox, supra note 65, at 29.
The Securities Exchange Act is unique to the extent it prescribes a co-
operative regulatory effort by the SEC and industry-sponsored groups,
... [called SROs]. Currently, there are four types of SROs embraced by
the Exchange Act: the national securities exchanges, the national securi-
ties association, registered clearing agencies, and the Municipal Securi-
ties Rulemaking Board.
Id.
85 Kevin G. Salwen, Former Comptroller of Currency Staffers Charged With Insider Trad-
ing by SEC, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1992, at Al.
86 See John J. Gavin, The Need for Market Intelligence, in PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 1990 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 245, 1990), available in WESTLAW, Database
JLR, 696 PLI/CORP 245 at * 1. Stockwatch "combines the latest in technology
with sophisticated knowledge of the marketplace to detect and identify significant
share accumulations. It provides market surveillance." Id. The resources to iden-
tify accumulations include 13F filings, depository lists, registered holders list, Non-
Objecting Beneficial Owners (NOBO) lists, 13D filings and street contacts. Id.
87 One of the factors in deciding whether to prosecute cases is to what degree its
negative impact would have on short-term markets. Spencer Derek Klein, Insider
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Lewis D. Lowenfels
One word Bill McLucas did not use was choice. Of course he
makes choices. Of course his staff makes choices. Of course the
Commission makes choices. And those choices are as to blocks
of cases as well as to particular cases. Message cases are going to
be brought. The choice of what is a message case, of what
message is to be conveyed is, to use Roberta Karmel's term, a
political choice, without a capital "p." It is a choice of where the
emphasis in the enforcement program or, as Bill McLucas put it
at the very end, where the allocation of resources is going to go.
Insider trading was not a dictated decision. It was a political
choice, with a small "p," to put emphasis into that particular part
of the program. It goes on all the time. As Alan Bromberg said,
each of the three major areas-what violations to charge, what
type of proceeding to institute and what sanctions to recom-
mend-all involve choices, little "p," political choices.
Part H
Criminal Securities Priorities
Leonard M. Leiman
We will turn now to the criminal side, with Michael Chertoff
leading off.
Michael Chertoff88
I thought we were doing the criminal side already! I am go-
Trading, SEC Decision-Making, And The Calculus Of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 665, 681 (1988).
88 U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey. Graduate of Harvard College and
Harvard Law School. Mr. Chertoff worked in private practice for three years after
serving as a judicial clerk to Circuit Judge Murray I. Gurfein in New York and
Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. of the United States Supreme Court,
respectively. In 1983, he was appointed as Assistant United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York. The "Mafia Commission" case was just one of the
significant and successful actions which Mr. Chertoff prosecuted. In 1987, Mr.
Chertoff was appointed First Assistant United States Attorney in the District of New
Jersey. Within this position, he prosecuted and convicted former State Senator
David Friedland for racketeering and mob figures for racketeering and murder. In
June of 1990, Mr. Chertoff assumed the position of United States Attorney. His
significant activities have included being lead trial counsel in the successful
prosecution of Gerald McCann, former mayor of Jersey City, NJ.
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ing to make Bill McLucas seem like a pussy cat. I am going to
give everyone on the panel heartburn.
I am not a securities lawyer and the reason that is important
is because I do not view these issues through what I consider to
be the somewhat narrow prism of people who are securities law-
yers by training and for whom the criminal process is just an ad-
junct to the securities law process. I am a prosecutor and I have
been by profession for close to ten years. To me securities fraud
is a species of fraud-like tax fraud, bank fraud, telemarketing
fraud, consumer fraud."9 Mainly, what securities fraud involves is
lying about things that are material, lying in your books and
records and lying in your disclosures. Insider trading is a form of
lying or nondisclosure by people who have obligations to dis-
close. ° ° I think that perspective is very important. I think it is
probably shared by almost 100% of the prosecutors who serve as
United States Attorneys or in positions of authority in the De-
partment ofJustice. That perspective is important, I think, in un-
derstanding the attitude that we take to securities enforcement. I
do not reject a lot of what was said, but there are some funda-
mental premises with which I differ which I would like to talk
about for a few minutes before I begin with the rest of what I
have to say.
I think that the danger with much of what I have heard is the
danger with any group of professionals or people who operate
within a small club in which the rules are highly technical and
complex. The professionals suppose the essence of their subject
matter is unintelligible to mere mortals and that therefore they
should be left alone to police themselves and take care of their
own house in private. There are two places in the world that I
am aware of in which this view of enforcement has been prevalent
and I think they have been horror shows. I am not saying this is
limited to two areas. One is England9 ' and one is Japan. 2
89 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Equitable Life Assurance, 289 N.Y.S. 1064, 1067 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1936) (traditionally, fraud is generally any kind of artifice employed by one
person to deceive another). Generally, fraud involves the "intentional perversion
of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some
valuable thing . . . or to surrender a legal right." BLACK'S, supra note 35, at 660.
90 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
91 E.g., Nicolas Bray, Securities Lending In U.K. Dealt Blow By Maxwell Affair, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at AI0. "The scandal over the late Robert Maxwell's alleged
pillaging of his companies' pension funds has dealt a blow to securities lending [in
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I had some personal experience some years back in private
practice in dealing with regulators in England. The view for a
very long time in the City of London was that the insiders policed
their own securities, insurance and other financial crimes. When
problems arose it was taken care of in the club room. They got a
stern tongue lashing and perhaps there was some modest recom-
pense to the victim and then matters were cleaned up. As a re-
sult, I think there was a pervasive distrust of financial institutions
in England which ultimately, although I think it is now being cor-
rected, could have damaged the ability of London to remain an
international capital of finance.93
I think Japan is worse. In Japan there are now scandals so
profound that they threaten the fabric of Japanese society.94
Scandals in which it seems that everybody is involved in a kind of
massive insider trading and government information swapping.
Scandals in which law enforcement authorities have very deliber-
ately shied away from attacking significant actors who were in-
volved in violation of criminal laws and regulatory laws. I am not
an expert in Japanese culture, but from what I read, I think that
this is so pervasive that there are now serious questions about the
ability ofJapan to operate in a law-abiding fashion at the highest
reaches where that country is governed. 9 Maybe it makes a dif-
Britain]." Id. Since cases of fraud in the early 1980s, safeguards have been enacted
to ensure that sufficient collateral is provided. "In Britain, lenders normally de-
mand collateral equivalent to 105% of the value of the securities they are lending,
but in the case of some borrowers this can rise to 110% or more, depending on
creditworthiness." Id. These safeguards, however, apparently were not observed
in the Maxwell case.
92 Maggie Farley, How to Make a Killing in Japan: Teton Partners' George Noble Shorts
the Market and Wins Big, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1992, at 37. The Japanese market,
some claim, is rigged, marked by insider trading and almost impossible for foreign-
based investors to understand.
93 See supra note 91 for some of the ongoing lending reforms being shaped in the
British markets.
94 See, e.g., Clay Chandler,Japan Penalizes Securities Firms in Stock Scandal, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 1991, at A3, A10 (Tokyo Stock Exchange scandal led to a government-
imposed suspension of corporate business at four securities firms); Clay Chandler
& Quentin Hardy, Ministry Broadens Sanctions on Nomura, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at
C1, C16 (Japan's Ministry of Finance ordered a securities firm to suspend various
operations because of "excessive promotion" and illegally compensating favored
clients for losses); Douglas R. Sease, Japanese, Securities Scandal Slams Stock Prices in
U.S., WALL ST. J., June 25, 1991, at C l (resignation of senior figures in the wake of
charges that securities firms had compensated customers for investment losses).
95 See Japanese Major Proposes Coup to Clean Up Politics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992,
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ference to Japanese society, maybe it does not. Maybe there are
people who think that from the standpoint of increasing eco-
nomic wealth it is more efficient to have an inside group at the
top controlling everything. That view, however, is fundamentally
inconsistent with the way American society works, and if there is a
political dimension to what we do as prosecutors it stems from a
vision of what society is about and what our obligation is in pro-
tecting society. To me that obligation is fostering fairness and
equality-demonstrable fairness and equality that everybody can
see. Enforcement of the law across the board, insiders and out-
siders alike, is an example of that.
I also disagree with the idea that there has been a tremen-
dous setback for securities law enforcement as a result of adverse
rulings in a few of these high profile criminal cases.96 I think it is
too easy to buy into the myth which has been promulgated in
some quarters, and notably in the Wall Street Journal editorial
pages, that all these cases are bankrupt; that they were all re-
jected because of the judicial distaste for the criminalization of
securities law;97 that everything again should be returned to the
inner sanctum of the board room of the New York Stock Ex-
change where insider trading or any other kind of misconduct, if
it is misconduct, should be dealt with through "appropriate"
administrative sanctions preferably under the veil of
confidentiality. 98
at AI 1 (army personnel call for a coup in wake of illegal donations and bribes ac-
cepted by political figures); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Kanemaru 's Resignation from the Diet
Portends Cleanup in Japan, Critics Hope, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1992, at All (Liberal
Democratic Party vice chairman resigns over admittedly taking $4 million in cam-
paign contributions from a company with alleged ties to gangsters); Jacob M.
Schlesinger, Politics 'in Flux'in Japan as Scandal Ensnares 2 Leaders, WALL ST. J., Sept.
30, 1992, at A10 (written confession submitted by government official for accepting
excessive contributions).
96 See supra note 54.
97 E.g., Wade Lambert, Jefferies, Top Insider-Trading Witness, Draws Modest Fine, Is
Put on Probation, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1989, at 2 ($250,000 fine and five year proba-
tionary period deemed mild in comparison with defendant's wealth); Sokolow's Sen-
tence in Insider Trading Case is Reduced, WALL ST.J., May 5, 1987, at 17 (insider trading
sentence of defendant reduced by one-third). But cf. Mark C. Hansen, Public Sympa-
thy for Milken and GAF Spurred on Salomon, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1991, at A12.
"Looking back on the prosecutions of the 1980s, it becomes apparent that the gov-
ernment, for the most part, won its battles in the court but lost them in the public
eye." Id.
98 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1992) provides that:
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If you look at the sum total of the cases that were produced
in the Southern District of New York in the 1980s, there were
numerous cases in which people were convicted of outright fraud
and insider trading in securities laws. 99 I confess that I was a
member of that office. Although, I was not in the securities unit,
I did organized crime work. So I have disclosed my personal
interest.
Some people take the position that Michael Milken did not
really commit crimes.' 0 0 Some people believe that this half bil-
lionaire, with legions of lawyers at leading law firms in the coun-
try, was brow beaten by two or three assistant United States
Attorneys and a couple of postal inspectors. This is ridiculous.
The reality is that the man pleaded guilty to multiple felonies. In
the opinion, Judge Wood imposed a ten year sentence, and
Judge Wood is not a maniac. Although relatively new to the
bench, she had been a partner at a big Wall Street firm. The
sentence imposed on Milken clearly reflects his serious and
profound acts of misconduct.' 0 ' Whether or not you think he did
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is
found by the Commission ...
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or
(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethi-
cal or improper professional conduct, or
(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation
of any provision of the Federal securities laws.
Rule 2(e) applies to those professionals who have acted in a "dishonest, incompe-
tent, unethical or unprofessional manner." Cox, supra note 65, at 1021-22. The
promulgation of this rule was to ensure the preservation of the integrity of the
Commission's own processes. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d
Cir. 1979).
99 See, e.g., supra notes 12, 15 & 45.
100 JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 45 (1991). "[T]he myth grew up and was
cultivated by Drexel that Milken was a 'genius' who discovered the profit potential
of Uunk bonds]." Id.
101 Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Gets 10 Years for Wall St. Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1990, at Al. After Mr. Milken was to serve his term, he would have faced a three-
year period of probation. Furthermore, Mr. Milken, in addition to the $600 million
in fines and restitution already paid when he pleaded guilty, would have also been
required to perform a total of 5,400 hours of community service. Id. Subsequently,
Mr. Milken's cooperation with prosecutors, restitution to victims in excess of $1
billion and family illness reduced his prison sentence to only two years. Deborah
Pines, Milken Wins One Year Off Prison Term, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 1; Ronald
Sullivan, Milken's Sentence Reduced by Judge; 7 Months Are Left, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1992, at Al.
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other things that are good or bad is irrelevant. It is simply un-
mistakable that there was a pervasive attitude in the market in the
1980s that anything goes! As Tom Wolfe observed, there was
the attitude, "We are masters of the universe and above the
law."10
2
I disagree with the notion that an earlier panelist advanced
that the SEC and the United States Attorneys' Offices pursue
what is "fashionable."'' 1 3 I think it is very much the reverse.
What tends to become fashionable is what we have pursued be-
cause in the making of the cases the press becomes interested.
Next, they begin to look for the dramatic story. Then it rises to
the public consciousness. When the initial prosecutions that led
ultimately to Boskey and Milken were being pursued in the United
States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York, se-
curities law was not particularly a fashionable issue to be covered
by the press. The press was spending most of their time with
drugs, organized crime and some of the political corruption scan-
dals. It was only after people started to plead guilty and the win-
dow opened up to this world that the press became interested
and people started to look for the deeper thematic issues in-
volved in those prosecutions.
Finally, on a somewhat narrower point, my last disagreement
with earlier remarks relates to the suggestion that the new Secur-
ities Enforcement Remedies Act 10 4 for the SEC gives rise to a
respectable argument that federal criminal law is preempted.
There are legions of cases out there in which the courts have re-
jected arguments that the existence of narrow regulatory stat-
utes, even narrow criminal statutes, are meant to preempt
broader and more general criminal statutes. 0 5 Those preemp-
102 E.g., Review & Outlook: Symbol of the 1990s, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1990.
"Michael Milken has often been depicted as the symbol of the 1980s, the Master of
the Universe presiding with Ronald Reagan over the decade of greed." Id.
103 See supra views of Professor Roberta Karmel in text at 35.
104 See supra note 38.
105 "When an act violates more than one criminal statute, the [g]overnment may
prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of de-
fendants." United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979). See also
United States v. UNI Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981) (Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act did not "preempt" application of general criminal statutes to con-
duct regulated by the Act); United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (enactment of medicaid fraud statute did not preempt use of other federal
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tion challenges are typically applied to the mail fraud laws and
the fraud and false statement laws under § 1001; they are rou-
tinely rejected by the courts. 10 6 The only area in which I think
this contention has ever been accepted is in the context of extor-
tion, where there is a so-called labor exception to the extortion
statute.'0 7 Other than that, I have never seen a body of case law
that treats this sort of implicit preemption as an argument to be
accepted.
Now, let me tell you what we do. I have given you my prem-
ises. We operate as an arm of the Department of Justice and
someone said the tail of the United States Attorney's Office wags
the tail of the SEC. 10 8 I think to us, we are the dog and the SEC
is the tail. No offense of course! What I mean to say by that,
seriously, is that our securities law cases do not come to us in
neat packages which say "securities law." They come to us in all
sorts of packages. A lot of our securities cases are also bank
fraud cases.' 0 9 There are cases that we have entered into by en-
forcing the bank fraud laws, 10 which we are obviously doing very
aggressively now. For example, we discovered that apart from
taking out a $50,000,000 line of credit based on ten years of
phony receivables, a company that is the target has also used the
phony receivables to pump up their earnings on their SEC filings.
So we get into the case as a traditional bank law enforcement case
and not because it comes labeled as a "securities law" case.
We tend to look at the core violation, core criminality which
really is, at bottom, lying about material things in a way that hurts
criminal statutes). No firm rule exists "that the government must choose to prose-
cute under a specific rather than a general statute." Id. at 237 (footnote omitted).
106 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (knowingly and willfully falsifying, concealing, or
making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations punishable by
fines or imprisonment or both).
107 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-877 (1955).
108 See supra remarks of Theodore V. Wells in text at 29-30.
109 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1992) (misapplying
funds and making false entries in bank books and records; failing to disclose self-
dealing in connection with bank's securities investment); United States v. Stavrou-
lakis, 952 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1992) (conviction for money laundering conspiracy,
bank fraud, and uttering and possessing forged securities affirmed).
10 E.g., United States v. Celesia, 945 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1991) (check kiting can
constitute "scheme or artifice to defraud" in violation of bank fraud statute);
United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991) (bank need not suffer finan-
cial loss, only necessary to prove that fraudulent scheme or artifice placed bank at
risk of loss).
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people. When we find that kind of violation we look to see what
the relevant criminal statutes are to address it depending on who
the victims are. There are often multiple criminal statutes."' In
other words, we do not get into it as an adjunct of the SEC.
Often the SEC is working parallel to us. Occasionally they will
refer matters to us or we will refer matters to them. We really are
not driven by an administrative agency in general. We are driven
by anti-crime and anti-fraud agendas. As a consequence of that,
we don't rely exclusively on the SEC to do our investigating.
However, the SEC is tremendously cooperative with us. We
often do work together in pursuing particularly sophisticated
cases. We also use the FBI, the postal inspectors, and the agen-
cies in the state bureaus of securities."12 All these agencies coop-
erate in giving us manpower.
We also do not confine ourselves to the kinds of techniques
that are traditional in SEC enforcement cases. Subpoenas and
depositions are typical ways to make paper cases, and we use
those techniques too. But, we also use electronic surveillance,
bugs and wires. "' We have been successful in penny stock cases
in intercepting calls in which people are openly discussing fraud-
ulent conduct and market manipulation.' l 4 We use undercover
operations and have been successful in using those operations
with agents posing as investors or people who want to be in-
volved in criminality in the stock market. That is how we pene-
trate a penny stock operation.'1 5 We also rely on international
I I I In addition to federal securities laws, state racketeering and white collar law
affords overlap in cases involving deception or fraud. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-6-1 (West 1991) (state RICO); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-5-59(2) (1988) (Attorney
General authorized to conduct white-collar crime investigations to protect public
rights or statewide interest).
112 ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., THE SEC's 1988-89 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: THE
RUDER-LYNCH YEARS (P-H 1990). Since early 1989, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has taken an increased role in the prosecution of fraud. For instance, securi-
ties and commodities fraud task forces have been formed in U.S. Attorneys' offices
in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, New York and Kansas City. DOJ
personnel coordinate efforts with the SEC, CFTC, IRS, Postal Inspection Service
and the FBI. These task forces focus on "boiler room" schemes, stock loan frauds,
precious metal fraud, bank and brokerage fraud, tax evasion and obstruction of
investigations. Id.
''3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2519 (1978).
114 See supra notes 48-49 & 160-163 and accompanying text.
''5 Id.
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treaties.' 16 Increasingly we have taken advantage of protocols in
treaties that have been entered into with Switzerland and the
Cayman Islands to help us obtain information that was formerly
considered outside of our jurisdiction."17 Parenthetically, you
could spend a whole program on what I think is the wave of the
future, which is the internationalization of securities enforce-
ment. I believe there will have to be an increase in cooperation
efforts by international and national enforcement agencies to ef-
fectively enforce the laws, just as we have cooperation on the
116 See Richard M. Philips, et al., The Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment in the 1990s, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 381,
390 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 755, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Fraud Enforcement].
In investigating international fraud, the SEC has sought to take advan-
tage of several bilateral treaties which the U.S. has entered into for the
provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters. Treaties are cur-
rently in effect with Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey.
Treaties with the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, the
Cayman Islands, Columbia, Mexico, Morocco and Thailand have been
entered into but are not yet ratified by both parties.
Id. at 435 (citing Michael D. Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Developments in International
Securities Law Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1990, at 821, 877
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 683, 1990) [hereinafter
Mann & Mari]. "Since securities law violations are punishable by criminal sanc-
tions, the treaties are available to assist the SEC in its enforcement investigations,
but such assistance is generally available only where the conduct is punishable by
criminal sanctions in both the requesting and executing countries." Id.
117 Fraud Enforcement, supra note 116. "The Swiss treaty 'provides for broad
assistance in . . . criminal matters . . . including assistance in locating witnesses,
obtaining statements and testimony of witnesses, production and authentication of
business records, and service ofjudicial or administrative documents.' " Id. at 436
(quoting Mann & Mari, supra note 116 at 877-78). The Swiss Treaty only applies to
investigations of offenses which are criminal in nature under both the laws of Swit-
zerland and the United States.
The treaty "is applicable to both court proceedings and ancillary civil
proceedings. It is available to the SEC during investigations of criminal
conduct under the securities laws. The Swiss Treaty also contains a pro-
vision which allows Switzerland or the United States to refuse to assist a
request that is likely to 'prejudice its sovereignty, security or similar
interests.' "
Id. (citation omitted).
The Cayman Islands Treaty provides for mutual legal assistance in crim-
inal investigations and prosecutions that involve offenses punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment under the laws of either the U.S. or
the Cayman Islands. The Treaty also authorizes cooperation with re-
spect to specific crimes, including insider trading and fraudulent securi-
ties practices.
Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
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state and federal level to deal with law violators who are violating
the laws of several states.
We use all kinds of statutes. We use the securities laws stat-
utes and obviously there is an interest that the Commission has
in the development of the securities laws, but very often we use
even simpler statutes. We use mail fraud" 8 and wire fraud stat-
utes' which are garden variety fraud statutes used in a multi-
plicity of areas which do not require any particular sophistication.
These statutes need not be addressed in terms of SEC policy,
because what we are going after is traditional, hard-core crimi-
nality. Not marginal questions; not questions of negligence or
honest misinterpretations of the law. We are looking for people
who write things down on financial statements that are lies and
that they know to be lies. That is what we are using those statutes
for. We use money laundering statutes t20 for people who take
the proceeds of their criminality and either attempt to hide it or
apply it to some other use.
Something that Bill McLucas said, which I think deserves a
great deal of emphasis, is our willingness to prosecute for ob-
struction ofjustice and perjury when it arises not only in criminal
investigations, but also in civil investigations. 121 We will do that
when people lie before the SEC. The idea that somehow truth
does not count in an SEC action is a dangerous and wrong idea.
Clients who are under that misimpression will lose it rapidly
when they find themselves indicted. We take those cases very
seriously.
The last issue I will deal with is the racketeering law issue.
118 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (frauds and swindles punishable by monetary penal-
ties and/or imprisonment).
119 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) (fraud by wire, radio or television punishable by a
monetary fine and/or incarceration).
120 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. IV. 1982) (imprisonment and/or fines). A court may
alternatively impose a fine of not more than twice the amount of the ill-gained
property. Id. § 1957(2).
121 E.g., United States v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339, 1349-52 (8th Cir. 1985)
(false statements by witness before grand jury were material to support perjury
conviction); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(crime of perjury is deemed committed where the false statement is uttered);
United States v. Kline, 366 F. Supp. 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defendants
deemed to be adequately warned before questioning at SEC investigation, and
therefore, answers given could provide a basis for perjury counts against
defendants).
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We have brought a significant number of racketeering influenced
and corruption (RICO) cases against people involved in wide-
spread and pervasive patterns of stock fraud. 22 These are cases
of individuals selling stock on the basis of false promises or rep-
resentations about the investments, like claiming to have in-
vented beer cans that are supposedly self-chilling, or miracle
health cures. People are spending thousands of dollars getting
themselves enmeshed in these schemes. We have found over and
over again that there is a small group of people who have been at
the heart of many of these schemes. We have done RICO cases
against these people because in our view they are engaged in per-
sistent patterns of violations of mail fraud, wire fraud and securi-
ties laws. In the case of the F.D. Roberts brokerage firm, which
culminated in RICO pleas by senior officers, I think we had
twenty-five defendants who pleaded guilty.' 23
The second significant source of our racketeering cases are
122 See, e.g., United States v. Ofchinick, 883 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Elliot, 727 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Santoro, 647 F.
Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
123 See Frances Ann Burns, Former SEC Chief Examiner Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 1989, at E3 (defendant guilty of funnelling cash to organized crime
figures); John Crudele, Mob's Muscle Cited as Force Behind F.D. Roberts Penny Stock
Swindle, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1990, at D6 (mob involvement in fraudulent securities
dealings at F.D. Roberts Securities); Ex-Official of Stock Firm is Guilty of Racketeering,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at C8. The case pertained to high-level managers of
F.D. Roberts Securities Inc. involved in racketeering and a stock-manipulation
scheme that allegedly netted $67 million dollars from 1986 to 1988. Id.; Penny-Stock
Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at D2 (former chairman and part-owner of
F.D. Roberts Securities Leonard Tucker pleaded guilty to penny stock fraud);
Steven A. Rosenbush, 3 More Settlements in Penny Stock Case, STAR-LEDGER (Newark),
Oct. 27, 1992, at 29-30 (New Jersey civil prosecution of F.D. Roberts defendants
netted an additional $2,354,378 in settlements).
The SEC found material omissions and misrepresentations of fact within the
registration statement of Hughes Capital Corporation for which F.D. Roberts Se-
curities was the underwriter and market maker. Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746
F. Supp. 1264, 1268-69 (D.N.J. 1990). See id. at 1272 (indicating that the civil com-
plaint alleged six omissions from the registration statement). One member of
Hughes Capital implicated the Roberts firm in a host of illegal securities activity in
his guilty plea. Id. at 1274. In his own guilty plea, the President/Director of F.D.
Roberts admitted illegal activity relating to securities sales at F.D. Roberts, includ-
ing concealment of material information from the investment community. Id. at
1275. The admissions of F.D. Roberts' treasurer confirmed these statements. Id.
See also In re F.D. Roberts Sec., Inc., 115 B.R. 485, 495 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) (grant-
ing in part and denying in part F.D. Roberts' petition for an order to enjoin the
New Jersey Attorney General from proceeding with criminal actions against the
firm while it underwent bankruptcy proceedings).
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those which involve phony invoicing and inflated earnings on fi-
nancial statements. 24 For example, Coated Sales, Inc. was once
touted in the financial publications as a notable high-rising
growth company.' 2 5 Unfortunately, over a ten year period its
earnings were inflated by millions of dollars of phony receiv-
ables, totally made up fiction. Ultimately there were RICO pros-
ecutions out of that.'
26
We have also done some non-RICO cases. I do not have any
difficulty in seeing these as criminal cases. I do not see anything
marginal or questionable about it. If you have people printing
up phony invoices or you are altering your books and records by
adding zeros to your receivables, that is a crime! I do not think it
needs to go to the SEC or anything of that sort and I do not think
the judges have any trouble with those cases.
We have done some insider trading. Not very much here be-
cause the exchanges are located across the river in New York.
One we did do, which was a little unusual, was a case against a
member of the Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
who was trading on inside information-tipping based on
124 See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991).
125 See Homeless Jailbird, FORBES, Aug. 17, 1992, at 19. A year before Coated Sales'
bankruptcy, commentators praised the company for its strong earnings record and
sales volume. Id.
126 Though this case resulted in guilty pleas, the underlying facts may be ascer-
tained from the civil litigation that it spawned. Coated Sales, Inc., a textile manu-
facturer, was incorporated in New Jersey in 1974 and became a publicly traded
company in 1984. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (D.N.J. 1989). The
firm filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 1988 and engaged the public accounting firm
of Peat Marwick Main & Co. as their auditors for that purpose. Id. at 1271. How-
ever, the auditors resigned after finding that Coated Sales' officers misrepresented
a $6,000,000 deposit with a machinery supplier. Id. at 1272. As a result, the com-
pany's Board of Directors removed the Chief Executive and other officers and made
public disclosure of the $6,000,000 overstatement in assets. Shearson Lehman
Hutton Holdings v. Coated Sales, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 639, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See also Bridge Capital Investors & Terrego, S.A. v. Coated Sales, Inc., No. 88-2651,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12908 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (granting defendant's mo-
tion to assert a third party complaint against insurer of an officer's Liability and
Corporate Reimbursement Insurance Policy); In re Coated Sales, Inc., No. 89-3704,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16968 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990) (dismissing appeal to pre-
vent the sale of the corporation while undergoing reorganization proceedings). See
also Coated Sales Inc., WALL ST. J., July 1, 1992, at C 19; Former Coated Sales Executive is
Fined $55 Million, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1992, at D4; Ann Hagedorn & Wade Lam-
bert, Former Officer of Defunct N.J. Firm Admits Role in Bank Fraud Scheme, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 17, 1990, at B12; Dana Wechsler Linden, Bogus Sales Inc., FORBES, Sept. 17,
1990, at 10 (Edward Giltenan, ed.).
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changes in the discount rate. 127 Again I do not have any difficulty
seeing those as crimes. Mr. Fleischman says there was a view in
the Commission, among certain people at a certain point in time,
that insider trading was insignificant. That may or may not be
true. I do know that it violates the laws of the United States. It is
not my job or the job of Commissioners to say we do not think
Congress is right in making this illegal. We are not going to just
ignore it and not enforce it. I think if there is a view to be pushed
on that basis it ought to be presented to Congress or the Com-
mission ought to make a ruling.
Let me deal with two last issues before I surrender my time.
One is the prosecution of advisors such as attorneys and account-
ants.2 8 We have prosecuted attorneys and accountants who have
been involved in cases where there is knowing misinformation
being presented to the public or knowing concealment of infor-
mation from the public.12 9 I have no difficulty prosecuting those
cases. I think it would be a terrible thing if there was a view that
lawyers live in a separate world in which they were immune to the
kind of scrutiny that everyone else is subject to. Now, let me be
clear about what I am saying. We are not talking about honest
judgment. We are not talking about advocacy within the bounds
of ethical avenues. We are talking about lawyers or accountants
who have assumed responsibilities and obligations as part of
their serving as advisors and fiduciaries of companies. If you are
an attorney for a corporation, it seems to me, you are a fiduciary
to the shareholders. If you knowingly operate together with the
principals of the company in creating phoiiy receivables, you
should be prosecuted.
The last issue is on the problem of pre-trial restraining or-
127 See Ex-Fed Director Sentenced To Jail For Leaking Data, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1989,
at C19; Arthur S. Hayes, N.Y Fed Official Leaked Data To Friend, Didn't Make A Dime,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1989, at C1;Joseph F. Sullivan, Ex-Fed Official Admits Disclosing
Rate Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at D2.
128 See supra note 98.
129 The SEC rule permitting the Commission to determine whether professionals
should be censured because of unethical or fraudulent conduct has been held valid
as necessary to protect the public. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582
(2d Cir. 1979). Accord Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Daniel
L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Dis-
cipline of Professionals, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652 (1991) (detailed analysis of the origin,
implementation and enforcement of Rule 2(e)).
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ders on assets. This is a very sensitive area and my own view is
that it is very important not to overuse the device of restraining
orders on assets, 3 0 particularly when you get into the issue of an
attorney's fees. Principally, I think it is a side-show that some-
times threatens to envelop the core of the case so much that peo-
ple lose sight of what it is we are trying to do in terms of the
ultimate essence of the prosecution. By the way, under the law
that allows a seizure or restraining orders of assets, the court
does have an opportunity to play a reviewing role, and the laws
generally provide for the posting of a bond in lieu of a freeze
order. 13' The underlying concern in these pretrial seizure cases
is what do you do when you are prosecuting people who can
move money in the blink of an eye. People who have, according
to the terms of the indictment, stolen money, should not be in a
position to squirrel the money away or move it offshore when the
government prosecutes. So the concern is, "what can we do in
the least intrusive way to make sure that if in the end the govern-
ment makes the case, the money will be there to be returned to
the victims?"
I guess my final observation is this. There are no doubt
cases about which people will disagree over whether they should
have been brought and whether the criminal statute that was
charged was too harsh. I think you have to take a balanced look
at all of the cases to determine whether the program is generally
on-course. I think it is. There may be excesses one way or the
other from time to time and that is simply natural. I think the
courts usually operate very effectively to prevent a problem with
that.
I was talking to Ted Wells at the break, and I think I agreed
with him as to one point and disagreed as to another concerning
the philosophy of bringing cases. I believe, and I agree with Ted,
that it is not appropriate to bring criminal cases to punish con-
130 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(d)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) provides that: "Upon
application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunc-
tion, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other
action to preserve the availability of property ... for forfeiture under this section."
131 Id. § 1963(e). "Following the entry of an order declaring the property for-
feited, the court may .... enter such appropriate restraining orders or injunctions,
require the execution of satisfactory performance bonds .... or take any other ac-
tion to protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered forfeited."
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duct that was previously viewed as lawful conduct or as to which
there was a reasonable question as to whether the conduct was
lawful.13 2 I fully agree with him as to that.
The harder question-I think where I disagree with him-is
what do you do with conduct that was clearly unlawful, but as to
which for a period of time, for whatever reason, the view was that
it was not going to be punished very seriously? In my view if it is
unlawful and people are acting with willful intent, 33 and it has
been on the books as a violation of the criminal laws, the fact that
the custom, and there is an element of "clubiness" to this,
treated it with a slap on the wrist does not carry a lot of weight
with me. I am not saying you execute somebody for the first of-
fense, but there is going to be a first criminal case, and I do not
think that you have to publish something in the Federal Register to
bring that case.
Leonard M. Leiman
Michael, I agree with Bill McLucas, you have offended, un-
doubtedly, everybody on the platform. I would assume a defen-
sive posture and try and figure out where we start. Why not start
with your recommended policy of intimidating attorneys and ty-
ing up assets so that people cannot afford to defend themselves?
Ed, you want to tackle that one?
Edward H. Fleischman
I hesitate because it is hard to have that type of discussion
with Mike because in practice, this has not been his practice. His
132 See generally Fowler v. State, 676 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ark. 1984) (affirmative de-
fense to violation of statutes, afterwards determined to be invalid, exists if actor
reasonably relies on it to guide his conduct); WILLIAM R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAw § 5.1(e), at 416-20 (2d ed. 1986); Livingston Hall & SeligJ. Seligman, Mistake
of Law and Mens Rea, 8 CHI. L. REV. 641, 654-79 (1941).
133 An act or omission is "willfully" done, if done voluntarily and intention-
ally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with
the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done;
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.
BLACK'S, supra note 35, at 1599. See also WILLIAM R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL
LAw 825 (2d. ed. 1988) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (1962)). "A require-
ment that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly
with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose
further requirements appears." Id.
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office has never taken any extreme position with respect to tying
up attorneys' fees. In fact, it has been one of the more enlight-
ened offices in terms of recognizing the constitutional problems
that are created by putting any type of a condition on a person's
ability to defend himself. I am not even sure he said anything
about attorneys' fees. In terms of the forfeiture area, much of
that is controlled out of the main justice Department in Washing-
ton, D.C. by the Organized Crime Section,'" as to all RICO
problems. 135 One of the things that came out of the Princeton-
Newport experience was that, prior to the Princeton-Newport in-
dictment, there was a freeze put on the business of that broker-
age firm.' 3 6 It closed over a billion dollars worth of assets just by
the government suggesting that it was going to put them out of
business. They continued to freeze. Business ultimately was
forced to liquidate pre-indictment. 137 As everybody knows, even-
tually the principals were exonerated. 138 The Justice Depart-
ment, out of the Princeton-Newport episode, published new
guidelines that made it far more difficult for prosecutors, both in
local offices and in main Justice, to approve massive freezes of
that kind. 139 The hot issue that exists today is not really so much
freezes by the Department ofJustice but really freezes now by the
Office of Thrift Supervision, arising out of the savings and loan
situation. 140
134 See OFFICE FED. REG., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1991/92,
377-78 (1991) (contains an overview of the section's duties in areas of labor-man-
agement racketeering, loansharking, extortion and RICO). See also U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUST. MANUAL: CRIMINAL Div., tit. 9, ch. 110 (P-H Supp. 1992)
(establishes guidelines for criminal division's Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, DEP'TJUST. MANUAL: CRIMINAL DIv., tit. 9, ch. 3 (P-
H Supp. 1992) (sets forth criminal division's statutory obligations).
135 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
136 United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The jury
assessed over $4.8 million in RICO forfeitures against the Princeton-Newport part-
ners. Id. at 449-50.
137 United States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
138 United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1991) (convictions of vari-
ous appellants on all counts except conspiracy vacated). The conspiracy count was
subsequently vacated. United States v. Regan, 946 F.2d 188, 188 (2d Cir. 1991).
139 See JANET E. FERRIS, U.S. DEP'T. JUSTICE, STARTING FORFEITURE PROGRAMS: A
PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE (1992). See generally GEORGE N. ALYESWORTH, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY: AN OVERVIEW 19-26 (1991).
140 E.g., Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision v. Lopez, 960 F.2d 958 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (prima facie case of bank fraud justified freezing of assets); Paul v. Office
of Thrift Supervision, 763 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (temporary cease and de-
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I think the most controversial thing that Mike would say to
me is his notion that the United States Attorney's Office should
be the head and the SEC Enforcement Division should be the
tail.' 4 I The problem I have with that, and I do see this just the
opposite, is that ultimately many of these questions come down
to how you exercise prosecutorial discretion. 42 I believe it is
very difficult for local United States Attorneys' Offices, who are
not involved regularly in securities prosecution, to have sufficient
experience and a feel for the industry as a whole as to what is
going on and what types of messages have been sent by other
regulatory bodies to exercise that prosecutorial discretion in the
best fashion. Because of that, I would like to see some type of
control by the SEC and the enforcement people in terms of how
that prosecutorial discretion is exercised. Michael Chertoff re-
ferred to hard-core criminality. It just depends where you want
to put it on the spectrum.
Leonard M. Leiman
Priorities, is it not Ed, what you are talking about?
Edward H. Fleischman
Well, it is more than priorities, it is really somebody with
more experience in the industry sitting down and trying to figure
out how a case should be fashioned. There are probably more
sist order granted to prevent officer-shareholder from dissipating assets). See gener-
ally 15 U.S.C. § 1462 (West Supp. 1992) (establishes and proscribes powers of the
Office of Thrift Supervision).
141 See supra remarks of Michael Chertoff in text at 47.
142 See JOAN E. JACOBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DE-
CISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1977). External environmental factors that influ-
ence a prosecutor's discretionary activities include a community's characteristics,
the workload, the judicial system and office resources. Id. at 1;JAMES I. K. KNAPP ET
AL., PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (Cal. Crim. Law Practice Series (3d ed. 1979)).
"Charging discretion takes three basic forms: (1) evidentiary sufficiency-a deter-
mination of whether the evidence warrants prosecution; (2) charge selection-a de-
termination of the appropriate charge or charges; and (3) discretion not to
prosecute-a determination of whether there is an alternative to formal criminal
prosecution." Id. at 5; THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAw 4-
6 (Burton Atkins & Mark Pogrebin eds., 1978). Prosecutorial discretion extensively
includes the selective prosecution of offenders, plea bargaining and giving strength
to, or emasculating, law enforcement policies by not prosecuting violations of law.
Id. at 4.
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checks and balances within the enforcement division than in any
other area of the law. I mean, to get a case out of the Commis-
sion, a lot of people touch it. It is really hard to get a case out of
the office.1 43 It just has always struck me funny that you have to
go through all of these hurdles to get a case out of the SEC, but
in the local United States Attorney's Office, you can get a case
out very easily' 44 and you are not always as fortunate to have a
head prosecutor such as Michael Chertoff, who I think is really
the exception rather than the rule. What Michael has done in the
past is bring the hard-core cases in terms of Coated Sales 145 or F.D.
Roberts,1 46 but that has not existed in a lot of places.
Leonard M. Leiman
I think it is important to note that when Michael talks about
bringing a Coated Sales type of case, when crude fraud is perpe-
trated over a long period of time and harms a great many people,
nobody questions whether it should be brought as a criminal
prosecution or not. It is back to those cases where the regulation
may be a little bit soft or nobody quite knows what the regula-
tions are. When conduct that occurs in that area is prosecuted
criminally, that gets people upset. Roberta, you had something
to say on this?
Roberta S. Karmel
Yes, it is really a follow-up comment that is related to what
was just said. Michael started out by saying the choice here is
143 E.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES LITIGATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§ 12.01 (1992). Under the Exchange Act of 1934, the Commission may issue re-
ports of investigation, pursue disciplinary proceedings against professionals, issue
stop orders, refer matters to the United States Attorney General in order for civil or
criminal proceedings to be instituted, or initiate such proceedings itself. Id. To
procure injunctive relief, the SEC must show a violation of the securities law and a
"reasonable likelihood" that, "absent the ordering of an injunction, the defendant
will engage in future violations." Id. § 12.02.
144 See DAVID SCHWARTZ & SIDNEY B. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGATION 658
(1963) (Attorney General has broad power to institute suits on behalf of the United
States so long as the action pursues and/or vindicates a legitimate national inter-
est). See also 28 U.S.C. § 515 (1966) (Attorney General's authority for instituting
legal proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1966) (conduct of the litigation reserved to
the Department of Justice).
145 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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between criminal prosecution of hard-core criminality where
there is lying and self-regulation. I would assert rather vigor-
ously that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not self-
regulating. It is an independent federal agency 47 that has al-
ways, I think correctly, been perceived as an agency with a lot of
integrity, very tough, and hardly an agency in the control of the
securities industry. So, I do not think we are talking about a situ-
ation that may exist in England 4 8 or Japan.' 49 The issue here,
really, Ed Fleischman said before, is which part of the govern-
ment that may be responsible for policing the securities markets
is going to make the choices about the kinds of cases that are
going to be prosecuted and the kinds of cases that are going to
shape future law and regulation. If all the United States Attor-
neys' Offices were just bringing mail fraud and wire fraud cases
involving hard-core criminality where there is lying, I do not
think we would be having the discussion that we are having here
this morning.
147 Like the Phoenix, the Securities and Exchange Commission rose from the
ashes of the Great Depression and the stock market crash of 1929. SUSAN M. PHIL-
LIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (2d ed. 1982).
Established by the Securities Act of 1934, the Commission was a response to the
Hoover Administration's failure to successfully install a self-governing compliance
system. Id. at 8. Presently, the SEC works alongside state agencies and has juris-
diction over certain non-exempted securities involving the mails or interstate com-
merce. DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE
5 (3d ed. 1986). Toward insuring theoretical independence, the members of the
Commission are appointed by the President of the United States, and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. Only three of the five commissioners may be mem-
bers of the same political party; terms are staggered. LARRY D. SODERQUIST,
SECURITIES REGULATION 8-9 (2d ed. 1988). The SEC places primary reliance on the
independent accounting profession to promulgate uniform standards for reporting
companies. RATNER, supra, at 14-15.
148 Unlike the American model, England's securities regulation system is com-
plex and decentralized with much decision making conducted at non-governmental
organizations. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION REPORT 23-24 (Buraff Pub-
lications, June 29, 1992). See also UK: Confused Future for Local Authority Stock Lending,
REUTER TEXTLINE, (Feb. 10, 1992) (uncertain status of securities lending in
England).
149 TheJapanese securities system is dominated by bureaucrats with large discre-
tionary powers and a long history of political favoritism, including individuals who
hold both regulatory positions with the government and with private securities
firms. Robert Neff et al., Hidden Japan: The Scandals Start to Reveal How the System
Really Works, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 37-38; Can Tokyo Repent?, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 3-9, 1991, at 16; Rigging the Rules, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5-11, 1991, at 85; Who
Watches the Watch Dog?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21-27, 1991, at 94.
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Leonard M. Leiman
I'd like to go back, if I may, to the attorney involvement in
this and the concept that one of the areas of priority is making
sure that participation by a member of the Bar in misleading the
public will be punished criminally. Intimidation was my word,
not Michael's, but plainly a lawyer who is engaged in dealing with
regulatory authorities on behalf of a client who is always looking
over his shoulder loses some effectiveness in conducting himself.
I wonder whether it is having its effect. Lew, you are in this area
a lot, what do you think?
Lewis D. Lowenfels
I think it is having an effect, and, Michael, what I would sug-
gest very respectfully, as a defense-type of a person, is that the
priorities here-I am divorcing myself from my occupation and
looking at myself as an American citizen-would much prefer
that the United States Attorneys focus on drug cases' 50 and on
organized crime cases.' 5 ' That is where the resources, it seems
to me, should be poured in. We have other agencies-we have
150 America's "War on Drugs" campaign has become a top priority throughout
the federal court system. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.
1992) (conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana affirmed); United States v.
Bailey, 955 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1992) (conviction for possession and intent to dis-
tribute cocaine); United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (crack
cocaine commerce); United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1992) (con-
victed felon found guilty of firearm and drug possession); United States v.Johnson,
952 F.2d 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (drug trafficking conviction reversed; co-defend-
ant's subsequent testimony may not be considered); United States v. Christoffel,
952 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant convicted of possession with intent to
distribute and import marijuana); United States v. Morris, 781 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (defendant convicted for aiding and abetting the distribution of mari-
juana and cocaine); United States v. Ross, 778 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (de-
fendants convicted of conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to
distribute marijuana).
151 See, e.g., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311
(1992) (regulatory agency cannot invoke RICO treble damage provision to protect
against stock fraud conspiracy); United States v. Church, 955 F. 2d 688 (11 th Cir.
1992) (RICO conviction upheld against defendant engaged in drug enterprise);
Harrell v. DCS Equipment Leasing Corp., 951 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (insuffi-
cient evidence for RICO claim); Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1991)
(RICO claim dismissed for failure to show corporation conducted pattern of racke-
teering activity); Cadle Co. v. Schulz, 779 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (plaintiff
successfully established cause of action for RICO violations against defendant);
United States v. District Council of N.Y.C. & Vicinity of the United Bhd. of
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the SEC, we have the NASD, we have the states, they can deal
with, to pick up your language, "lying about something mate-
rial." You are absolutely right that those statutes are on the
books, 1 52 you are absolutely right that, if somebody lies about
something material, it will fit in within the criminal statute, but I
am not sure the resources should be allocated to that. A second
point is, it disturbs me, and it disturbed me greatly when the in-
sider-trading cases came out, to find the electronic surveillance,
the telephone taps, all the paraphernalia that you would normally
use in hard-core violent crimes applied to the securities area. 153
There is nothing attractive about securities fraud, and when you
take the Coated Sales cases,' 54 that is particularly unattractive, be-
cause that is hard-core. But there is a lot of "lying about some-
thing material" that is not the worst thing in the world. Not that
I am trying to defend it, but it is a long way from masses of drugs
being brought into the country and destroying the lives of masses
of young people. So from my standpoint, I would say very re-
spectfully, I think it would be better for the Republic if the
United States Attorneys focused in other areas and let the SEC,
the states and NASD freely deal in the securities areas.
Michael Chertoff
I could not disagree with that more. I mean, one of the
things, of course, which is true about drugs and even organized
crime to some extent, is that traditionally state and county prose-
cutors have been very involved in that,' 55 whereas the federal
Carpenters & Joinders of Am., 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (violation of
RICO statute upheld against a labor organization).
152 See supra note 106. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1982) (fraud and related activity
in connection with access devices); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1982) (fraud and related ac-
tivity in connection with computers); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud).
'53 See United States v. Santoro, 647 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). In prosecut-
ing the Lucchese crime family under RICO, the government successfully minimized
the use of electronic surveillance in charging the defendants with aiding and abet-
ting in securities fraud. Id. at 162, 169-70.
154 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., Moreland v. State, 212 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (insufficient
evidence for drug possession conviction); Jones v. State, 324 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975) (heroin possession conviction); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 281 N.E.2d
274 (Mass. 1972) (mere presence at place where marijuana is present is sufficient
for conviction); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1969) (drug
possession conviction upheld although contact with drug was merely fleeting and
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prosecutors have a little bit more of an advantage in dealing with
interstate fraud schemes. But I really think this requires us all to
step out of our roles as lawyers and as securities people or
whatever and just think about ordinary citizens. I would shudder
to think of the public perception of a policy which said, "We are
going to go after poor people who traffic in drugs and poor peo-
ple who snatch purses but if it is a rich person who steals
$100,000,000, we are not going to do a criminal case." I think it
was Woody Guthrie who said that "you can steal a lot more with
a fountain pen than you can robbing a bank." He was right. We
want to have public acceptance and support for our criminal jus-
tice system and for our securities law system and for our securi-
ties markets.
We better let the public know that we are going to police
criminality, lying and stealing at whatever level. Now, we obvi-
ously balance, we do not necessarily give the same severity of
sentence, although in some instances we do punish severely-for
example, a person who defrauds people of their life savings de-
serves a stiffer sentence. I mean it is very easy to sit here and say,
oh, you know, it is not much damage. If your mother loses her
life savings to a stock swindle or a penny stock firm or because
there was some kind of manipulation of her pension fund, I know
that to your mother that is going to be a pretty serious life-de-
stroying thing that requires a criminal response.
Just turning briefly to telephone taps, these are difficult cases
to make. Often it is the best evidence we can get. Let me ob-
serve this-the initial use of electronic surveillance' 56 and of
RICO and a lot of these other tools in the securities area arose
because traditional organized crime has always been a player in
momentary); State v. Tate, 412 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant con-
victed of manufacturing marijuana); State v. Ivey, 439 P.2d 974 (Wash. 1968) (nar-
cotic possession conviction affirmed). See also State v. Pasante, 542 A.2d 952 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (NewJersey RICO statute held constitutional); State v.
Benevito, 350 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (defendants convicted of
conspiracy to violate gambling laws).
156 The procedure for interception of wire, oral or electronic communications is
set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982). See also United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413 (1977) (wire-tap application must specifically name all individuals; "principal
target" identification held insufficient); A.B.A. Standards Relating to Electronic
Surveillance § § 5.13-5.14 (1971) (authentication and procedural requirements per-
taining to time, sealing, custody and destruction).
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stock fraud. If you go back to cases like United States v. Weismann
in New York, you had various mob figures who sat and plotted
securities fraud in and around social clubs.'5 7 Among their loan-
sharking and their gambling activities you also found significant
swindles and penny stock frauds and other kinds of securities ma-
nipulations. No one disagrees that with respect-well maybe
somebody does-few people would disagree, I think, that with
respect to John Gotti or people who are traditional organized
crime figures, you use electronic surveillance. Is the rule, that
when you are Harvard graduates you are immune from electronic
surveillance? I have a real problem from an equality of the law
standpoint with that kind of principle.
Lewis D. Lowenfels
Mike, just to rebut for a second, I think you immediately turn
my argument from a question of priorities in different areas of
law enforcement into a class thing and rich guys and poor guys
and so forth. I do not think that the people in the securities in-
dustry overall are any richer than perhaps the drug dealers or the
people who engage in organized crime. I suggest to you by your
analogies with Japan and England, you started out with a certain
amount of a class orientation there. 158 Those societies are tradi-
tionally much more feudal societies, 159 much more rigid societies
from a class standpoint, and I think in those countries perhaps
there is a club or clique of people who have run things for a long
time. Their fathers and grandfathers and so forth have run them
and they think they are immune from prosecution. I would agree
with you on something like that. What I am arguing for is that in
the securities area, primarily, where you have other agencies set
up with public monies allocated to deal with these types of
problems, even though the United States Attorneys can deal with
them, I think it is better left to these other people except in the
157 624 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirmed racketeering, securities fraud, bank-
ruptcy fraud and conspiracy convictions).
158 See, e.g., CARLTON HAYES, BRITISH SOCIAL POLITICS (1913); PATRICK VEN-
TURINI, 1992: THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL DIMENSIONS (1989). See also Hideo Tanaka,
The Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.
REV. 375 (1985) (surveys Japanese legal attitudes and methods of dispute
resolution).
159 E.g., J.M.W. BEAN, FROM LORD TO PATRON: LORDSHIP IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND (1989) (discusses England's evolution of the feudal system).
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exceptional cases like a Coated Sales situation or whatever. That is
basically my point. I do not think it gets into money or who is
rich or who is poor.
William R. McLucas
One thing that Lew noted that disturbed him was the tech-
nique. We now have wiretaps 160 and search warrants' 6 1 in the
securities areas. You can legitimately ask the questions that make
sense. We do not do criminal investigations. We do not do wire-
taps, we do not do search warrants-we rely on the Justice De-
partment 62 to handle that and do it. Do not forget though, what
we are talking about is fraud. I do not think that the analogy
directly fits that it is a class thing-prosecute poor people crimi-
nally, white collar people civilly, but there is something there that
you cannot miss. A kid who takes fifty bucks from a Seven-Eleven
convenience store with a gun is going to jail. We ought not lose
sight of the fact that we need to do something with people who
use a phone or a pen and sell securities out of a boiler house or
commit penny stock fraud; do not underestimate what it did to
the average citizen in the 1980s. 16 3
160 The federal securities laws confer jurisdiction on the Attorney General to
prosecute offenses. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(l) (1982). Since the Securities and Ex-
change Commission does not have criminal jurisdiction, it does not have the au-
thority to seek or obtain wiretaps or search warrants. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(Supp. 1992); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. The Commission can, however, receive access
from the Department of Justice to information obtained from both wiretaps and
search warrants and has done so in the past. Most often, the fact that the Securities
and Exchange Commission obtained evidence in this manner is not a matter of
public record.
161 See supra note 160. See, e.g., SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, 798 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir. 1986) (search warrant allowed government to seize records of unregistered
commercial paper); In re Atratech, Inc., 1992 WL 40469 (Feb. 27, 1992) (trading
suspension imposed with evidence obtained in a search by the United States Attor-
ney's Office pursuant to a search warrant).
162 See supra note 160.
163 See, e.g., SEC v. Power Securities Corp., No. CIV.A.90-1579, 1990 WL 312149
(D. Colo. Sept. 6, 1990) (alleging scheme to defraud by, among other things, use of
materially false or misleading statements or omissions, investment recommenda-
tions without a reasonable basis in fact, and high pressured, coercive sales prac-
tices); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. CIV.A.90-4534-RK, 1990 WL 312430
(E.D. Pa. July 20, 1990) (scheme involved the distribution and sale of shares in shell
companies; fraudulent, high-pressured sales tactics; omissions of material fact and
undisclosed markups of up to 140%); SEC v. Thomas James Assoc., No. CIV.A.90-
0316-T, 1990 WL 310345 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1990) (underwriting involving undis-
1993] SECURITIES LA W ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES 65
The penny stock abuse in this country was absolutely as-
tounding, and some of those people ought to go to jail. You can-
not make those cases unless you do it with criminal investigative
techniques. I do not think that what the Department ofJustice is
talking about or what the SEC is talking about is policing this
industry with criminal surveillance techniques methodology. We
have got a whole industry that relies on self-regulation.' 64 We
have got 2500 professionals in the SEC to police the capital mar-
kets in the United States. If somebody thinks that we can do that
effectively and use criminal investigative techniques, we are go-
ing to have to substantially increase the number of people in the
budget.
I think what Michael is saying is that we ought to, on a selec-
tive basis, take some people and take some techniques that are
needed to demonstrate that if you do this stuff you are going to
go to jail. We ought to use it and not apologize about it, and we
ought to put people in jail for it. That is what his office has done,
and what some of the other offices have done. There was a crimi-
nal trial in Denver a month ago, a two-year undercover sting op-
eration where the jury came back with an acquittal after two
days. 165 I think it was an unfortunate development for the gov-
ernment, but I do not, for a minute, think that it means that you
should not use those techniques. We are talking about fraud.
These people do not walk in and say, "Oh, gee you got me, I
confess, and I'll give the money back." These people stole
money, and I think the development in the criminal area has
been a healthy one. At least as long as I am in the Division of
Enforcement, I will encourage it.
Leonard M. Leiman
Not to walk off this particular subject for a moment, but,
Michael, back to what you were talking about. You mentioned
closed domination and control of the market and fraudulent high pressure sales
tactics).
164 The federal securities laws contemplate use of a self-regulatory system both
by allowing for the creation of a self-regulatory organization, e.g., Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982), and exposing regulated entities
such as broker-dealers to sanctions if they fail reasonably to supervise employees.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982).
165 United States v. Rimson, CRIM.A.91-123-CR (D. Colo. filed Feb. 21, 1992).
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the memoranda of understanding with foreign governments.
Has the attitude of foreign governments towards enforcement of
securities laws, as we know them here in the United States,
changed significantly?
Michael Chertoff
Bill probably is much more involved with this than I am, I
mean-we only have the limited experience of having had a case
over in the Cayman Islands where we were, after lengthy legal
battling, able to obtain documents and testimony. 166 I believe
Switzerland and some other countries are now more accessible to
us.' 67 I do not know that it is so much a matter of their views of
the securities laws as maybe an increasing sensitivity that it is not
appropriate for a country to bill itself out as a safe haven for peo-
ple who want to hide money from regulators or prosecutors. But
Bill, I think, is probably much more involved in developing these
things.
William R. McLucas
We have negotiated agreements with probably fifteen differ-
ent foreign sovereigns to exchange information and participate
in law enforcement. Ten years ago we made requests for assist-
ance and information from every foreign government, where we
had a case that we had to get assistance. 168 Today, we get more
166 United States v. Cannistraro, No. CRIM.A.89-218-L, 1992 WL 172680 (D.N.J.
Feb. 11, 1992). In this RICO case, the United States Attorney's Office made a
treaty request to enforcement officials of the Cayman Islands regarding the right to
obtain testimony and evidence located there. Id. at *1. In addition, the United
States filed a motion for leave to take depositions in the Cayman Islands. Id. Both
applications were granted.
167 The SEC has entered into Memoranda of Understanding on information-
sharing with authorities in Switzerland; the United Kingdom; Japan; the Canadian
provinces of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia; Brazil; France; Italy; Luxem-
bourg; and the Netherlands. See 1990 SEC ANN. REP. 20-2 1. The SEC has entered
into similar agreements with additional countries. E.g., SEC Release No. IS-429,
1992 WL 188981 (July 8, 1992) (Spain); SEC Release No. IS-354, 1991 WL 288656
(Dec. 18, 1991) (Argentina); SEC Release No. IS-181, 1990 WL 322079 (Oct. 18,
1990) (Mexico).
168 Typically requests for information made by either party to Memoranda of Un-
derstanding are non-public. In at least one administrative proceeding, the fact that
the Commission had obtained information pursuant to Memoranda of Understand-
ing was disclosed publicly. See In re Dominick & Dominick, Inc., Admin. Proc. No.
3-7502, 1991 WL 294209 (May 29, 1991).
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requests from those governments to us than we make. That is an
indication that the trend, in terms of developments in interna-
tional markets, is more conducive to our attitude about law en-
forcement in the markets than I think we would have anticipated.
But the fact is we now can get a lot of information; we do have
good cooperative arrangements. It takes time, it is cumbersome,
but you can no longer open a Swiss bank account and assume
that you are home free.
Leonard Ml. Leiman
Indeed, that could be the most significant development of
all. I am going to stop this portion of the discussion. I now want
to give Ed Fleischman a full chance to give his reflections of the
Securities and Exchange Commission after five years. I will say,
by way of introduction, that I have known Ed most of my profes-
sional life. I do not know of anyone who is a keener student and
observer of the Commission, of the statutes, rules and the cases.
He has an encyclopedic knowledge of the subject, and he
brought to the Commission quite a rich body of experience as a
practicing lawyer. I am as interested, as I am sure you will be, in
hearing how he distills his five-year experience from the Commis-
sion side.
Part III
Reflections of a SEC Commissioner
Edward H. Fleischman
The compliment from Len is very much appreciated. The
last time we met was just a couple of weeks ago in a presentation
I made in New York, and Len was one of my most insightful and
decisive critics-a guy who both sides can give comments. I am
not going to deal with the criminal aspects. My knowledge from
a criminal prospective is minimal. I refer to Michael Chertoff on
all those issues. Nor am I going to deal, I think it is equally im-
portant to say, because when you think of criminal, you think not
only of the wiretaps and so on, but also the increased burden of
proof, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold. Further-
more, I am not going to deal with something that Lew Lowenfels
mentioned in passing, and that is the NASD.
It is not wiretaps; however, it is the process within a self-
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regulatory organization that nobody can exist without coopera-
tive membership. It is a non-necessity for any burden of proof
beyond a mere establishment of conduct that does not measure
up to fair and equitable principles of trade; a deliberately moral
rather than a legal standpoint. I do hope, however, having lis-
tened now with you for these past two hours, that by coincidence
some of the things I am going to say are going to reflect themes
that you have heard from all of the commentators, as well as from
Len.
The presentation of civil and criminal enforcement priorities
points out more of their similarities, it seems to me, than their
differences. But Bill McLucas' and Mike Chertoff's presentations
went to substance rather than process. My reflections, which
again are limited to the civil side, will perhaps fill out your under-
standing by going solely to process. I am lucky by the construc-
tion of the program that you have to take these reflections
without any elucidations that the panelists' responses may give;
because there are no panel responses called for to these reflec-
tions that Len has already told you. There are several process
themes arising out of the enforcement program of a civil agency
that I would like to squeeze into these next few minutes. If I do
these correctly, the themes will blend one into the other to end
up with a kind of single overall pattern.
So let us start by remembering that a civil enforcement
agency is no more than a conglomeration of human beings, of
people, who take pride in what they do. Know that for the most
part, they want their efforts to punish lawbreakers to succeed
and, of course, they become convinced by the logic of their own
cases, their own arguments. That is only human. The individual
trees-the investigations and the particular prosecutions-tend
to overwhelm the forest, which is the achievement of law compli-
ance and which, even more than retribution or discouragement,
is the true aim of the enforcement program. If you or I, have
spent six months or thirty-six months on an investigation and my
chief or even those Political, with a capital "P" appointees, the
commissioners, who decide my case and who decide whether my
case is strong enough to bring, determine it is not strong enough
to bring, what happens to my self-esteem as a human being, not
to speak of my year-end evaluation by my superiors?
Or, if you or I, as a commissioner, have spent months or
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years rationalizing an enforcement program to buttress the confi-
dence of investors in the markets, as a general matter, do you or I
as that commissioner have time for, or sympathy, or understand-
ing of a Wells submission, 169 that is either based on the general-
ity of a Wall Street practice, on technical interpretation of the
statutes, on rules even if they are correct interpretations, or on
appeal to rethink interpretations that have already been ren-
dered? Is it not, after all, right to argue that the function of an
administrative agency is to interpret its statutory responsibilities
broadly, or that the statutory adverbs and adjectives could not
have been intended by Congress to limit the commissioners' or
the stockpersons' discharge of legislatively-mandated remedial
responsibilities? Think of what those adverbs and adjectives,
particularly "willfull", mean in the Thirty-Four Act.
The courts have long been persuaded that the purposeful-
ness suggested by "willfull" is satisfied by the mere doing of the
deed consciously,170 not being asleep when you do it, without the
need of a conscious disregard for the law, not willfulness in any
normal sense or recklessness.1 7' The court derives a substitute
for knowledge that is intended particularly to preclude the viabil-
ity of any "see no evil, hear no evil" avoidance defense. But reck-
lessness has been gradually pared down in cases where hindsight
clearly demonstrates the quality of the conduct which was en-
gaged in.' 7 2 So that today, recklessly means little more than that
169 Cox, supra note 65, at 1010. A Wells submission is a written statement by
subjects being investigated by the Commission which affords a possible defendant
the opportunity to make a case against a probable SEC enforcement proceeding.
Id. However, "[tihe attorney must prepare the submission without knowing the
precise nature of the staff's case and without access to all the evidence available to
the staff." Id.
170 The courts have been forced to implement a working definition of "willfull"
because the Exchange Act of 1934 is silent on setting forth such a legal standard.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Synonymous with willfulness
is scienter-the "intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use
of some practice to defraud." Id. at 193 n.1 2.
171 E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (reckless con-
duct closely approaches conscious deception); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cited in Sanders v.John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790,
793 (7th Cir. 1977) (reckless conduct is highly unreasonable and represents an ex-
treme departure from ordinary care standards).
172 Broad v. Rockwell Intern Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980), cited in
Sanders, 554 F.2d at 793 (reckless conduct should not be liberally construed so as to
obliterate a distinction between negligence and scienter).
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same court-approved willfully,' 73 not recklessness in any usual
sense. Aiding and abettingl 74 -this ties back into issues raised by
Michael.
Lawyers cannot avoid being prosecuted as principals. Like-
wise, lawyers cannot avoid being prosecuted as aiders and abet-
tors. The courts have described this concept as being derived
from the criminal law, but nowhere is it found in the securities
statutes as requiring a general awareness of wrong-doing. 75
Which again usually is circumstantially derived, like recklessness,
from the very fact of having engaged in the conduct at issue. Put
all these together and any requirement of cognition, which is
usually implicit in the law of violations, has been extracted from
the securities laws. In the same category, add the requirement
that non-disclosures 17 6 or mal-disclosures177 relate to material
facts. 178
Despite Supreme Court admonitions, the notion of the sub-
stantial change in the total mix of disclosures is again, like reck-
lessness, circumstantially established in hindsight from the very
fact that the disclosure was incorrect. 179 What drives an adminis-
173 See Sanders, 554 F.2d at 793. Recklessness, under certain circumstances,
"comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of
ordinary negligence." Id.
174 See Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 450 (1893) (active participation by
words or acts is included in criminal definition of aiding and abetting); Bailey v.
United States, 416 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (participation in the ven-
ture must be such that by his action, a defendant intends the venture to succeed).
175 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (one who acquires
information via a fiduciary relationship may not use such for his own benefit). "[A]
tippee assumes a fiduciary duty.., not to trade on material nonpublic information
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty.., by disclosing the informa-
tion to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). See also Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (one may not profit from the use of inside information).
176 E.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC In-
dus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (omitted fact may signifi-
cantly alter the total mix of available information)). See generally Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must plead and prove
that misstatement or omission was made with scienter).
177 Ross, 607 F.2d at 555-56.
178 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449) (material
fact is one that a reasonable investor would consider important when making a
decision). Furthermore, a material fact is necessary for a shareholder to make an
informed choice. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970)).
179 TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. "[Tlhere must be a substantial likelihood
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trative agency to pare or attenuate the key concepts on which
guilt or liability rests? Well, in part, it is the advocate inherent in
all of us-pushing the law, always pushing the law-a little bit in
favor of the agency. This methodology represents the advocate's
mind. In part, it is the very proper desire to fulfill the remedial
responsibilities assigned to the agency by Congress and the Pres-
ident. 18 1 In large part, it is the fear of judicial decision-making
that some malefactor, whether a greater or lesser one, is exoner-
ated because a purpose, state of mind or substantiality of facts
has not been sufficiently established by conventional proofs.'"' It
is far easier for the agency if the thresholds to liability have been
pulled down. The insistence on hindsight de-substantiates the
scienter and the materiality standards. 18 2 The result may be
good for the public image of the agency, but it is destructive of
the larger responsibility of a government litigant, namely, to pro-
mote the integrity of the justice system in this country and to
serve the public's interests rather than the agency's own.
To switch for a moment, but not getting off this subject, the
classical intertwining of quasi-executive, 83 quasi-legislative' 84
and quasi-judicial 8 5 functions in an administrative agency raises
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able." Id. (footnote omitted).
180 The executive branch generally executes and enforces federal law via its ap-
pointment power. WILLIAM BENNETr MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES: NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 190 (5th ed. 1947). Such is evident within the
Securities Exchange Commission because the President is responsible for ap-
pointing the agency's five board members. Id. at 238. See supra SODERQUIST, note
147.
181 The requisite proofs for a Rule lOb-5 violation include an affirmative showing
of various elements. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231 (material act or statement);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (duty to disclose); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (scienter); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (con-
duct that occurs in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
182 See supra note 170 (scienter); notes 178-79 (materiality).
183 Federal commissions are generally quasi-executive in nature because they
have numerous delegated advisory and oversight functions and its commissioners
are presidential appointees. See generally United States v. Knox, 694 F. Supp. 777,
781 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (President's power to remove members of Sentencing
Guidelines Commission held proper under separation of powers doctrine).
184 "The power of an administrative agency to engage in rule-making." BLACK'S,
supra note 35, at 1245. A commission's function is quasi-legislative when it spawns
guidelines that become substantive law. Knox, 694 F. Supp. at 781.
185 Quasi-judicial applies "to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
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similar issues. In case A, the agency has authorized prosecu-
tion186 and approved a consent settlement, 8 7 implicitly recogniz-
ing that both stages state the agency's view of the law. The
investigation and the consent order implicitly recognize and es-
tablish what the agency's current view of the law is as applied to
the facts.' 88 This same process occurs in subsequent cases.
Then along comes a case in which the indictment may be deliber-
ately misused. The indictment stage 8 9 is exactly the same as in
the prior cases, and the Commission approves the order. But in
this case, however, litigation gets substituted for settlement. Af-
ter trial by an administrative law judge, de novo review' 9 0 comes
back to the very same agency heads' 91 who went through the pro-
cess in all the prior cases, and who have now authorized the pros-
ecution of this particular case. To some extent, they already have
a commitment to a view of the facts. I would articulate that, per-
haps in terms of a presumption of the propriety of the view of the
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis
for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." BLACK'S,
supra note 35, at 1245. Quasi-judicial power involves the ability of an administra-
tive agency to adjudicate the rights of parties before it. Id.
186 See STEINBERG, supra note 143, § 12.01.
187 Utilizing its own internal standards, the Commission may decide whether to
litigate or settle cases. Id. § 12.06.
188 There are no policies or guidelines which determine when and where the SEC
decides to begin an investigation. This power is vested in the agency's discretion.
Cases generally arise as a result of complaints from the public, as referrals from
self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchange, or simply by SEC person-
nel reading the newspapers. Interview with Robert Anthony, Esq., Staff Counsel,
Securities Exchange Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 16, 1992).
189 The SEC district office responsible for conducting the investigation will com-
pose a memorandum to the Commission in Washington, D.C. suggesting whether
there has been, in the opinion of the region office, a violation of securities laws. Id.
190 E.g., Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1987). De novo review
means that the court's review of the agency decision is not restricted to the admin-
istrative record, but may instead pursue whatever avenue of inquiry it deems appro-
priate. Id. at 697-98. De novo review is intended to be a "fresh, independent
determination of 'the matter' at stake." Id. There is no deference to the agency's
conclusion. Id.
191 The SEC district office which initiated and coordinated the investigation will
make the recommendation to investigate to the Commission and will exercise sub-
poena power to require the production of records, call witnesses, take testimony
under oath and inspect offices and other documents. The district office will also
present the case to the administrative law judge and, in the case of an appeal, to the
Commission itself. Interview with Robert Anthony, Esq., Staff Counsel, Securities
Exchange Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 16, 1992).
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facts on which they gave the approval for the indictment, they
have really made a commitment to an active prosecution which
was absent in antecedent cases. After all, didn't they have a
broad purpose in mind in proposing the rule that is in question
or requesting the legislation that is at issue? Have not they ap-
plied the law just this same way in the earlier cases?
Now, are the prior consent decree cases precedent? Even if
not formal precedent, we all have to understand that they be-
speak the agency's view of the law. How do these administrators,
who are human beings after all, divorce themselves from the per-
formance of their quasi-executive billy-club responsibilities to
discharge their quasi-judicial black robe responsibilities in some
neutral way? Does the system really depend simply on the
change of personnel as an antidote to precommitment?
These are issues of constitutional dimensions. The constitu-
tional dimensions were put to rest years ago. 92 But the fairness
dimensions, the appearance of disinterest, and again, the larger
responsibility of a government agency to promote the integrity of
the justice system and thereby to serve the public's interest be-
came apparent to me. That is why the opportunity to prosecute
in the Article Three Courts'"3 rather than in the administrative
process should be pursued as often as possible. That is why al-
ternatives to prosecution, methods to encourage law compliance
through the judiciary's use of the carrot as well as the stick,
should be pursued as broadly as feasible.
Finally, we demand greater integrity of our law enforcement
officers and our law enforcement agencies than of any other par-
ticipants in our American society. We know that public
prosecutorial enforcement is not only the handiest, but also the
most reputation-building tool that any agency or any regulatory
official has available. There is no other method that rivals prose-
192 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). The Supreme Court has
maintained that even where investigative and adjudicative functions are combined,
there remains a presumption of integrity and honesty in those serving as the adjudi-
cators. Id. at 47. " 'The case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea
that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due
process ...... Id. at 52 (quoting 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 1302, at 175 (1958)).
193 "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
cution for broad-based lawmaking, deterrence of conduct
whether it is lawful or unlawful, or creation for the notoriety of
the public press, which are the soliloquies to public and congres-
sional attention in the peculiar theater we call Washington, D.C.
The larger responsibility of a government agency demands that
jurisdiction not speak for personal aggrandizement. Rather the
government agency must always be kept subservient to the goals
of law compliance, market efficiency and promotion of the justice
system. In this way, a government agency could serve at least in
this one field, the goals that are mandated by Congress and the
President in the name of the public for its protection and
interest.
Leonard M. Leiman
Thank you Ed. This is a subject that, as Roberta Karmel sug-
gested, has a long history and a large body of learning. It is a
subject that we will probably not be able to advance any further
today. I will close by saying that, as moderator, I have viewed my
role as something akin to a substitute teacher. I am suppose to
maintain order and not teach very much myself. So I can say, as
we conclude, that this discussion was at a level of sophistication
that I have not heard often in my years at the Bar and participat-
ing on other panels. I think you really owe the panel members a
hearty thanks for their participation.
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